

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
AND  
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION  
SECURITY INDEX**  
**FILE NUMBER: 100-358086**  
**SECTION : 27**



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

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## **NOTICE**

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - ~~ALL D~~  
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTSDATE: January 19,  
1954

CR [initials]

SYNOPSIS:

Twenty-one offices still engaged in preparation of summary reports in non-Key Facility and non-Key Figure Security Index cases, exclusive of New York Office in which project is suspended. The 21 offices have submitted 6,539 such reports of 11,241 scheduled, and all indicate deadline of 7-14-54 will be met. Of the 21 offices, twelve have submitted less than 75% of the reports, only four have submitted less than 50% - Los Angeles, Philadelphia, San Diego and Seattle. Status of project in New York Office analyzed. Breakdown of status in the 21 offices attached. In all offices other than New York, 8,741 of 13,469 summary reports had been submitted as of 1-1-54, approximately 65%.

ACTION:

I will follow the field and advise you of the status of this project upon the receipt of the status letters due 4-1-54.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Attached for approval are letters to ten offices, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, New Haven, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Diego, San Francisco and Seattle, reiterating necessity of meeting deadline of July 14, 1954, in this project and containing appropriate comments with respect to the progress of the program in the particular office.

(2) Attached also for approval is a letter to the New York Office advising them that their delinquent status is being analyzed carefully each month in order that the resumption of captioned program in that office may be given consideration at the earliest opportunity that circumstances permit.

(3) That this memorandum be referred to the Administrative Division for information in view of the comments regarding manpower in the Chicago, Philadelphia and San Diego letters of January 6, 1954, each of which is attached with an outgoing letter to each of those offices.

RECORDED - 73

Attachment  
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DETAILS:

Each office is required to submit a quarterly status letter in connection with captioned project, reflecting the progress made in submission of these reports. These letters include statistics on all Security Index subjects who (1) are not employed in Key Facilities or (2) are not Key Figures. Summary reports on Key Facility employees were to be submitted at the time that the regularly scheduled six-month reports were due in each case. Summaries on Key Figures are being deferred until after summaries are prepared on all other Security Index subjects.

As you know, a moratorium was declared on the project until January 1, 1953, by SAC Letter Number 85 (H) dated September 3, 1952, to permit reduction of the backlog and delinquency in security work. This moratorium was partially lifted by SAC Letter Number 106 (A) dated October 14, 1952, which instructed those offices having personnel available to the project to reinstitute it immediately. By SAC Letter Number 53-48 dated July 14, 1953, the project was reinstated in all offices except New York, to be completed by July 1954.

My memorandum of November 5, 1953, in reporting the status of this project as of October 1, 1953, noted that the summary reports had been completed in twenty-five offices. Fifteen offices had

completed less than 75% of the reports and the remaining eleven offices had completed between 75% and 99% of the reports.

As noted previously, the New York Office <sup>is</sup> exempted from this program at the present time. The status in the New York Office will be discussed in detail elsewhere in this memorandum.

To insure proper planning by the field to meet the project deadline of July 14, 1954, as set in SAC Letter 53-48 (O) dated July 14, 1953, a letter was directed to the fifteen offices under the 75% figure, above, on December 17, 1953. Those offices were instructed to fully analyze the status of the project and inform the Bureau in the status letters due 1-1-54 of (1) their production in the last quarter of 1953 (2) their schedule for completing the project and (3) any other factors bearing upon completion of the program by the appointed time, 7-14-54.

A letter was also transmitted on the same date, 12-17-53, to those eleven offices in the area 75-99% as of 10-1-53, as noted previously, instructing them to submit the required status letters promptly after 1-1-54.

Replies to the foregoing have now been received reflecting that only 21 offices, excluding New York, have not completed the project as of 1-1-54. Of the 21, only 12 have submitted less than 75% of the reports scheduled; only four of the 21, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, San Diego and Seattle have submitted less than 50% of the reports scheduled under the initial phase of this project. All of the 21 offices have indicated that the project will be completed by the deadline date 7-14-54. Some of the offices expect to finish the reports much sooner, as indicated in the tabulation attached to this memorandum.

Set out hereinafter is a brief resume of the status of the program in each of the larger offices together with analysis of some of the problems presented and resolved in order to meet the stated deadline of 7-14-54.

Boston

The Boston Office has completed 291 of 353 scheduled reports, approximately 82%. The estimated date of completion has

set by that office at 3-31-54.

Chicago

The Chicago Office has submitted 801 of 1,242 scheduled reports, approximately 64%. To meet the Bureau deadline of July 14, 1954, Chicago is assigning additional personnel to meet a production rate of 84 summary reports per month. By letter of January 6, 1954, attached with outgoing letter to that office, Chicago has pointed out that in view of their decrease in Agent personnel such reassignment of Agents to prepare summary reports will result in an over-all increase in delinquency. The Chicago administrative report for December 1953 noted that Chicago carried 245 delinquent items of a total of 967 pending active cases in classifications 65, 100 and 105, approximately 25%. In investigations other than the above security classifications, however, the Chicago Office listed only 310 delinquent items of a total of 2,223 pending active matters or approximately 14%. Chicago letter of 1-6-54 contains the request that the Bureau consider the assignment of additional Agents to the Chicago Office in order that the summary report deadline may be met while at the same time maintaining security investigative work in a current status.

Detroit

The Detroit Office has submitted 726 of 969 summary reports scheduled, approximately 75%. Based on their past accomplishments, the Detroit Office should experience no difficulty in meeting the deadline.

Los Angeles

The Los Angeles Office has submitted 586 out of 2,318 summary reports scheduled, approximately 25%. By letter of January 5, 1954, attached with outgoing letter to that office, the Los Angeles Office has stated "It has become apparent that in order to meet the deadline which the Bureau has established drastic action must be taken, and I have therefore personally discussed the program with all agents assigned to the headquarters city regardless of squad assignment and have explained that each agent, other than those already assigned to Communist investigations, will be expected to prepare one summary report each month from January to June 1954. I have arranged for adequate basic training to be afforded agents thus participating in the program, and I

shall insist that the quality of the reports prepared continue to meet the Bureau's high standards." The letter concludes by stating that by utilizing the agents not engaged in security work as well as those who are assigned to such work, a total production of 290 summary reports per month is anticipated, resulting in the successful completion of the program at the appointed time.

Newark

Newark has completed 295 of 565 reports scheduled, approximately 52%. Newark letter of January 6, 1954, states that the remaining reports to be prepared have been assigned on an equitable and scheduled basis and are being followed closely by supervisory personnel to insure that the project will be completed by the deadline date.

New Haven

New Haven has completed 289 of 431 reports scheduled, approximately 67%. Based on their past accomplishments the New Haven Office should have no difficulty in completing the program by the deadline date.

Philadelphia

Philadelphia has completed 350 of 838 reports scheduled, approximately 42%. By letter of January 6, 1954, attached with outgoing letter to that office, Philadelphia has advised it plans to utilize 21 Agents full time on summary reports beginning about January 23, 1954. The letter concludes by stating "it will not be possible, with the present manpower complement and over-all work load, to effect any very substantial reduction in the security delinquency until after the initial phase of the Summary Report Program is completed. Until then, also, it will not be possible to re-open security cases for the preparation of annual supplemental summary reports according to the desired schedule." With regard to delinquency in the Philadelphia Office, the administrative report for the month of December 1953 reflects that Philadelphia carried a 38% delinquency in security classifications 65, 100 and 105, as compared with a 10% delinquency in classifications other than the above. The figure of 38% represents the lowest delinquency in the past six-months period in which the figure had been steadily reduced from 72% in July 1953.

San Francisco

The San Francisco Office has completed 1,379 of 1,986 summary reports scheduled, approximately 68%. The San Francisco Office has presented no problems which would prevent their completing their reports by the appointed time.

San Diego

The San Diego Office has completed 43 of 99 summary reports scheduled under the initial phase of this project, approximately 43%. By letter dated January 6, 1954, the San Diego Office has furnished a resume of their over-all personnel commitments noting that as of January 1, 1953, apparently meant to be January 1, 1954, that office had a case load averaging 35 cases per Agent stating, after noting that 5 Agents and the ASAC are scheduled for extended special assignment during the next three months, that a sixth Agent is on limited duty and the seventh Agent is going on extended sick leave for an operation on January 18, 1954. The letter states "In summation, it would appear that the present Agent complement of 36 Agents will consist of an actual effective investigative force, present in the Division, of about 25 Agents (without making allowance for sick or annual leave), resulting in an average case load of 50 cases for each effective. In light of the above, it does not appear that the allocation of additional Agent personnel to this project is possible or feasible and at the same time properly attend the other necessary functions of this Division. I will shortly prepare for the Bureau a complete analysis of the Agent personnel of this Division in the light of our case load and submit appropriate recommendations based thereon. The Bureau may rest assured that the San Diego Division will make every effort to attain optimum results with the available personnel."

Seattle

The Seattle Office has submitted 206 of 549 summary reports scheduled, approximately 38%. By letter dated December 31, 1953, Seattle stated: "To meet the schedule, ten agents have been relieved of all other assignments and will work exclusively on summary reports. In addition to these ten agents, summaries are assigned to all other agents on the Security Squad who are not exclusively assigned to special work, such as Toplev. A quota of sixty summaries per month has been set for the office in order that the deadline of 7/14/54 may be met. Monthly account of the total submitted will be made in order to be able to assess the progress of the project."

New York

As noted previously, captioned program is under suspension in the New York Office in consideration of the delinquent status of security work on an over-all basis. By memorandum from Mr. Clegg to Mr. Tolson dated December 12, 1953, captioned "Agent Personnel Needs on Intelligence Work, New York Office," it was stated that New York could use an additional 65 Agents for one year to bring the summary report program into current status. It was not recommended that such additional Agents be allocated to the summary report program, however, since they could more profitably be used in other phases of security work considered to be more pressing at this time. It does not appear feasible to attempt to reinstitute captioned program in the New York Office until the over-all security delinquency is brought to a current status. In this connection the progress of the New York Office in reducing such delinquency is being followed closely at the Bureau. As a matter of interest it may be noted that since January 1, 1953, when the over-all security delinquency was 76%, the New York Office has reported a steady reduction in both pending active and delinquent matters in the security classifications 65, 100 and 105 and as of December 31, 1953, the figure stood at 43%, based on 2,187 delinquent cases of a total of 5,115 pending active matters. The over-all delinquency in all classifications in New York as of December 31, 1953, was computed at approximately 33% of a total of 8,767 pending active matters. In cases other than 65, 100 and 105, New York reported 681 of 3,652 pending active matters as delinquent, or only 19%.

As noted previously, with the reduction of security delinquency to a current status, appropriate steps will be taken to consider the reinstitution of this program in the New York Office at the earliest possible opportunity. By letter dated January 13, 1954, the New York Office advised that based on a recent survey they presently have scheduled for preparation in the initial phase of this project, a total of 5,158 reports. Of those scheduled, reports have been submitted in 1,769 cases, approximately 34%. The number scheduled by the New York Office is subject to constant change in that with additions of names to the Security Index those particular cases automatically become part of the backlog on their summary report schedule. Summary reports are submitted, however, in many instances including specific requests from the Bureau and in those cases in which origin is transferred to another division. The New York Office is being requested to conduct a thorough analysis of their summary report project to assist in the consideration of resumption of the program in that office when circumstances permit.

General

As you know, the over-all number of reports scheduled under the initial phase of this project varies with the day-by-day content of the Security Index. Utilizing revised figures submitted in status letters from those offices still having summary reports to prepare, there follows a tabulation of the over-all scope of the project and the accomplishments to date, beginning 7-1-53, immediately preceding the reinstitution of the program on 7-14-53, as noted previously.

	<u>Number of Summary Reports Scheduled in Non-Key Facility and Non-Key Figure Cases</u>	<u>Number of Summaries Submitted</u>	<u>Percentage Completed</u>
(Including figures of New York Office)			
7-1-53	15,495	6,697	43%
10-1-53	16,028	7,724	48%
1-1-54	18,627	10,498	56%
(Exclusive of New York figures)			
7-1-53	12,659	6,517	52%
10-1-53	13,102	7,544	58%
1-1-54	13,469	8,741	65%

\* **STATUS OF SECURITY INDEX  
SUMMARY REPORT PROJECT  
AS OF JANUARY 1, 1954**

Security Index Cases on Other Than Key  
Facility and Key Figure Subjects

<u>Office</u>	<u>Number Scheduled</u>	<u>Number Submitted as of 1-1-54</u>	<u>To Be Prepared</u>	<u>Date of Completion</u>	<u>Percentag Completed 1-1-54</u>
Albany	152	137	15	3/31/54	90%
Anchorage	27	25	2	2/1/54	93%
Baltimore	240	214	26	3/31/54	89%
Boston	353	291	62	3/31/54	82%
Buffalo	165	161	4	4/15/54	98%
Chicago	1,242	801	441	7/14/54	64%
Cincinnati	170	144	26	5/1/54	85%
Detroit	969	726	243	7/14/54	75%
Indianapolis	181	124	57	7/14/54	68%
Houston	47	34	13	7/14/54	72%
Los Angeles	2,318	586	1,732	7/14/54	25%
Newark	565	295	270	7/14/54	52%
New Haven	431	289	142	7/14/54	67%
Philadelphia	838	350	488	7/14/54	48%
Pittsburgh	181	177	4	1/15/54	98%
St. Louis	134	72	62	7/14/54	54%
San Diego	99	43	56	7/14/54	43%
San Francisco	1,986	1,379	607	7/14/54	68%
San Juan	362	320	42	7/14/54	88%
Seattle	549	206	343	7/14/54	38%
Washington Field	232	165	67	7/14/54	71%
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,241</b>	<b>6,539</b>	<b>4,702</b>		

\* In the 21 offices which have not completed the program, exclusive of New York in which office the project is suspended.

Office Me dum • UNITE GOVERNMENT

UNRecorded 1/14/54

DATE: January 14, 1954

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY SUBJECTS EMPLOYED

BY U. S. GOVERNMENT

On January 7, 1954 Liaison - Gen'l

memorandum to Director of December 31, 1953, the Director noted that a list identifying individuals who are still employed in the Federal Government (1) who are included in our Security Index or (2) upon whom there is any suspicion of proof of subversive connections should be furnished to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

A list identifying the 16 Government employees who are carried in our Security Index was furnished to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General under date of January 7, 1954. The Employees Security Section has been reviewing files in connection with the second portion of the Director's request, namely, those individuals concerning whom there is substantial proof of subversive connections; however, they are not carried in Bureau's Security Index. All file cases reviewed indicate the individual is still Government employed as far as is known by the Bureau, their names are checked by the Civil Service Commission to determine if these records still reflect Government employment. This is necessary as in a considerable number of the cases reviewed, the Bureau has received no recent information regarding their employment status. Cards were furnished to the Civil Service through liaison in accordance with recommendations contained in your memorandum to Director of December 31, 1953 and transmitted to you of January 5, 1954.

Attached hereto are 296 cards each setting forth a name and identifying data of an individual who, according to a recent review of Bureau files, would appear to be still employed by the Federal Government.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a representative of the Liaison Section furnish the attached cards to the Civil Service Commission and request the Commission to check its records, note in each case the current status of the individual named as reflected in the previous statement and furnish confirmation. The Director has requested this matter be handled as soon as possible and the Commission should be asked to advise him of the earliest attention and furnishing the necessary information at the earliest possible date.

UNRECORDED  
1-14-54

The Employees Security Section is continuing to review files in connection with this matter and it is contemplated additional names will be submitted to \_\_\_\_\_ in the immediate future.

UNRECORDED  
1-15-54

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: January 15,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: MANUAL REVISION  
SECTION 87C - Manual of Instructions

SECURITY INDEX - GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION  
Bufile

SAC Letter 54-1 (M) contains instructions to the field regarding the establishment of a breakdown in the Geographical Section of the Security Index to be designated "Verification Pending." Such instructions necessitate certain changes in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions.

ACTION:

There are attached hereto the required changes in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions which should be incorporated into the Manual by the Training and Inspection Division.

It is requested that 30 copies of the changed pages be furnished to the Internal Security Section for use of the Security Index Supervisors.

UNCLASSIFIED  
1-15-54

January 15, 1954

**PROPOSED CHANGES IN  
SECTION 87C  
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS**

Page 305 - (8) (b)

1. Geographical Section

After receipt of the two 5 x 8 Security Index cards from the Bureau and after the necessary data have been added to one of the cards, it shall be filed in the geographical section of the index. (Except special section [and unavailable section cards] - see III and IV below.) This section shall be broken down geographically by residence address in accordance with the needs of each office. For example, where such breakdown is logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city and, by sections in the city so farant, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. There will be instances involving routine changes of residence. In such cases, the Security Index card should be filed under residence. To facilitate filing such cards in the geographical section, a breakdown wherein states, counties, cities, towns, "Municipalities" etc., will contain the Security Index card of all subjects whose addresses are listed as "Unknown" or "Out of town" are expected to result in the prompt location of the persons within the division and (b) sections of the Bureau. In similar fashion it is necessary to file changes of residence, if such is known, in the Bureau's "Unknown" file. The Security Index cards in the geographical section shall be filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown.

Enc. 1

1601

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: Jan. 22, 1954

✓ TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX / F. C. L.

During the past week, 81 new cards were added to the Security Index and 21 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 60 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,233.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 1-15-54

FROM :

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF <sup>100</sup> SECURITY INDEX FILES

Pursuant to your instructions I have reviewed consecutive Security Index files. Attached hereto is a list showing the case title and file number of the files. It is my opinion that each of the files reflects adequate justification for our action in placing the subject on the Security Index.

There were, however, 3 cases in which the latest investigative report was dated in 1949, and it would appear desirable that the field be instructed to submit reports in these cases so bring the files up to date. The 3 cases are as follows:

RECOMMENDATION

That this memorandum be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for appropriate action.

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: January 21  
1954

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -  
~~PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS~~  
BufileDETAILS:

Attached is a memorandum from [redacted] dated January 15, 1954, noting that [redacted] has reviewed consecutive Security Index files. The attached memorandum points out that during the course of the review, three cases were found in which the latest investigative reports were dated in 1949. Observed that it would appear desirable that the field be instructed to submit reports in those cases to bring the files up to date. The cases concerned were as follows:

You will recall from my memorandum under the above caption of January 19, 1954, setting out the status of this project in the field, it was noted that the Bureau has set a deadline of July 14, 1954, for the completion of the initial phase of the summary report program. It was further stated that the Los Angeles Office has completed 586 of a total of 2,313 summary reports under the initial phase of this program, approximately 25%. San Francisco has completed 1,379 of 1,986 reports, approximately 68%.

A review of the three cases mentioned by [redacted] indicates that they are a part of the backlog of cases scheduled for summary reports by the Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices. By letters dated January 5 and January 4, 1954, respectively, both Los Angeles and San Francisco assured the Bureau that the stated deadline of July 14, 1954, would be met.

In the absence of unusual considerations, it does not appear that the afore-mentioned cases should be distinguished from the other Security Index cases of the same type remaining in the Los Angeles and San Francisco backlogs and it does not appear that those offices should be asked to give them preferred attention.

RECOMMENDATION: That no action be taken on the suggestion of [redacted] to specifically instruct the field to submit up-to-date reports in the three cases mentioned above. If you

1

approve, the submission of reports in the three cases will be followed along with the other cases of the same type which are scheduled for preparation by the Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices.

G.P.  
JL

1604.

list

Assistant Attorney General  
Criminal Division

January 25, 1954

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LIST - JAN 25 1954

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of the individuals maintained in the Security Index. Names included in the main portion of the list are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals coming within five designated groups are listed on separate pages. Following each name is information reflecting the race, sex, birth date, Bureau file number and the Bureau field office covering the residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment

NOTE ON YELLOW ONLY:

Espionage Section of the Special Section not included.

The five designated groups are:

Foreign Government Employees  
United Nations Employees  
Pro-Tito Yugoslavs  
U. S. Government Employees  
Atomic Energy Program Employees

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1603

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 1/22/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS~~

There are attached two copies of a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index Cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship status, and others on one of the "special" lists. A key to the abbreviations is also included.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of January 15, 1954.

Attachments

1005

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN SECURITY INDEX

AL	Alien
CS	Comsab
DC	Detcom
KF	Key Figure
NA	Naturalized
NB	Native Born
TF	Top Functionary

AEP	Atomic Energy Program employees
BUL	Bulgarian
COM	Communist Party, USA
CZE	Czechoslovakian
ESP	Espionage subjects
FGE	Foreign Government employees
GOV	United States Government employees
HUN	Hungarian
ILL	Independent Labor League
ISL	Independent Socialist League
NPR	Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
PPA	Proletarian Party of America
PRO	Prominent Person
RUM	Rumanian
RUS	Russian
RWL	Revolutionary Workers' League
SWP	Socialist Workers' Party
ULP	United Labor Party
UNE	United Nations employees
YUG	Yugoslavian

ENCLOSURE

1005



BASED ON STATISTICAL SECTION REPORT AS OF JANUARY 15, 1954

CITY	TOTAL 14,174	BAPTISTIC TENDENCY OR ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION												SEX		CITIZENSHIP STATUS				RACE				SPECIAL SECTION													
		CON 22,640	EV 1	1%	PER 100	PA 574	PER 56	ES 1	PER 44	PER 778	PER 11	PER 6	PER 1	PER 83	PER 10,181	CS 7,566	PER 1,174	PER 80	MALE 15,674	FEMALE 8,500	IR 16,441	MA 8,019	AL 559	UN 156	BLK 21,640	MEET 2,831	OTHER 155	ARM 1	ARM 40	COV 17	PER 5	PER 44					
ATLANTA	273	270		2	1										133	91	23	1	175	98	208	51	7	7	249	22	2										
ATLANTA	43	43													19	15	4		27	16	38	2	3		61	1	1										
ATLANTA	29	27		1											9	6			23	6	24	5			27	2											
ATLANTA	16	13													7	7			10	4	19	1			10	6											
ATLANTA	329	319		4											2	102	113	43		202	127	247	76	6		293	36										
ATLANTA	11	11													8	4	3		7	4	11				10	1											
ATLANTA	603	572		2											265	190	24	5	396	209	459	124	6	4	567	36											
ATLANTA	235	195		2											139	82	25	1	161	74	195	31	6	3	200	35											
ATLANTA	82	82													39	25	10		59	24	76	7			82												
ATLANTA	55	55													33	28	2		37	18	53	1			47	8											
ATLANTA	1490	1330		39	20	17									18	458	583	126	5	1019	471	1057	349	47	19	1222	261										
ATLANTA	159	190													3	53	46	19		130	66	155	34	3	2	152	42										
ATLANTA	687	632		11		1									2	359	266	42	3	470	217	503	172	10	2	598	88										
ATLANTA	48	48														26	19	9		36	14	43	3			43	5										
ATLANTA	182	182														41	55	17		117	66	159	13	6		165	15	2									
CIT	1378	1260		25	1	3									78	1		11	679	483	45	4	995	393	930	349	52	7	1158	215	5						
CIT	16	16														7	6	1		10	6	13	1	2		16											
CIT	88	88														41	9	17		69	19	76	5	6	1	39	1	97									
CIT	70	66														39	28	10		53	17	62	5	3		53	16	1									
CIT	261	252		7		2										124	106	15	1	186	75	186	61	9	7	227	34										
CITY	46	43		1												15	10	4		32	12	43	1			41	3										
CITY	10	10														6	3	1		6	4	9	1			10											
CITY	21	21														13	4	1		14	5	19	2			12	9										
CITY	3844	3655		31	3	3									26	1325	1045	93		2205	1639	2876	878	78	12	3545	222	37									
CITY	23	23														14	7	4		15	8	22	1			21	2										
CITY	22	22															12	10	2		15	7	21	1			16	6									
CITY	119	117			2											56	36	4		79	40	70	66	3	2	119	3										
CITY	308	292													26	123	113	10	2	217	91	247	57	4		290	14	6									
CITY	515	435		1											79	172	159	24	2	345	170	432	72	7	4	498	16	1									
CITY	4	4															4	2		4					1	3											
CL	771	740		9	6										22				397	290	88	536	235	592	167	10	2		700	66	5						
CL	502	500														2	185	143	33	1	322	180	346	147	8	1	462	39	1								
CL	65	65														34	21	7		45	20	55	7	2	1	48	16	1									
CL	583	5567		3	32	75									18	126	8	1	10	2074	1551	166	15	3740	209	4256	1370	161	51	5342	426	70					
CL	17	17															6	5	1		15	2	13	4			13	4									
COCOA CITY	40	40															20	10	5		30	10	39	1			32	8									
COCOA CITY	44	44															17	13	4		33	11	42	2			40	6									
COCOA CITY	1112	1055		13	1	2									1		461	388	45	5	713	401	867	234	9	2	938	113	1								
COCOA CITY	88	85														2	60	15	2		61	27	63	22	1	2	43	5									
COCOA CITY	414	388		5											3	175	146	31	1	309	105	291	109	10	4	357	57										
COLA	211	207		2												1	82	66	11	1	150	61	183	26	3	1	208	3									
COLA	26	25														1	11	10	4		17	9	23	2	1		21	5									
COLA	149	163		1												5	93	55	28		113	56	142	23	3	1	130	30									
COLA CITY	70	70															40	20	7		41	24	75	4			74	5									
COLA CITY	35	34															16	11	4		19	16	29	9	9		34	1									
DAL	181	179		2												4	80	39	9		111	70	135	34	8	4	167	12	2								
DAL	2179	2101		19	1	54										4	1116	757	92	2	1303	876	1785	332	54	8	1933	207	30								
DAL	373	98		269													222	116	12	1	338	35	367	5	1		325	30	4								
DAL	8	8															2	2			6	2	8				6	6									
DAL	675	645		9												21				294	230	21	2	445	230	602	56	15	2	619	49	7					
DAL	99	97		2												3	106	80	9		72	27	82	16	1		83	16	1								
DAL	250	240		1	2											3	106	80	9		145	104	189	52	9	1	215	33	2								

FNC 2

1605

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: January 11,  
1954

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
~~PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS~~

4K

Bufile  
SUGGESTION #4-54DETAILS:

Attached is a suggestion originating with the Chicago Office, which has been referred to the Internal Security Section by the Training and Inspection Division, for comment. This suggestion proposes that present Bureau instructions regarding characterizations of relatives and associates of the subjects of summary reports be modified as follows: (1) Eliminate the requirement that data appearing in reports concerning relatives and/or associates of the subjects be attributed to specific sources, identified by temporary symbol numbers, and (2) utilization of more complete sketches attributed simply to informants "of known reliability." It is stated that the adoption of such suggestion will result in more comprehensive sketches of the relatives and associates.

As an example, data concerning a brother/subject, originating with multiple sources, would simply be lumped together in narrative form and attributed only to "informants of known reliability" without further identification of those sources.

As you know, Bureau instructions in this matter are contained in No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, pertinent portions of which are quoted herewith: "If it is found desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known Communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, the source of the information reflecting the associate to be a Communist should be identified. It will not be necessary to document further such information by conducting file reviews to determine the identity of the Agent receiving the information or location of the original exhibit in the files. In most cases, such information can be readily obtained from the summary reports submitted on the associates who, in most instances, are in the Security Index."

1606

It thus appears that the suggestion, in essence, is confined to the proposed discontinuance of the use of temporary symbols in the characterizations, since Bureau instructions impose no limitation as to their length.

It is believed that the suggestion is wholly undesirable. It is contrary to established practice of factual, analytical reporting. Considering the fact that our summary reports are given wide dissemination and may eventually be utilized in connection with Emergency Detention Program matters, their contents must be subject to closest scrutiny with all the data therein attributed to specific sources. The present procedure entails no reporting difficulties; as noted above, existing instructions do not require that sources be documented, but simply identified on the administrative pages.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to advise that the Internal Security Section does not favor the adoption of the attached suggestion.

*UNRECORDED*

January 25, 1954

**SECURITY SUBJECTS EMPLOYED  
BY U. S. GOVERNMENT**

On memorandum to of December 31, 1953, the Director noted that a list identifying individuals who are still employed in the Federal Government (1) who are included in our Security Index or (2) upon whom there is any substantial proof of subversive connections should be furnished to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

A list identifying the 15 Government employees who are carried in our Security Index was furnished to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General under date of January 7, 1954. The Employees Security Section has been reviewing files in connection with the second portion of the Director's request, namely, those individuals concerning whom there is substantial proof of subversive connections; however, they are not carried in Bureau's Security Index. If the files reviewed indicate the individuals are still Government employed as far as is known by the Bureau, their names are checked by the Civil Service Commission to determine if those records still reflect Government employment. This is necessary as in a considerable number of the cases reviewed, the Bureau has received no recent information regarding their employment status. Cards were furnished to the Civil Service Commission through liaison in accordance with recommendations contained in your memorandum to Mr. Ladd of December 31, 1953, and my memoranda to you of January 5, 1954, and January 14, 1954.

Attached hereto are 390 cards each setting forth a name and identifying data of an individual who, according to a recent review of Bureau files, would appear to be still employed by the Federal Government.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That a representative of the Liaison Section furnish the attached cards to the Civil Service Commission and request the Commission to check its records and note on each card the current status of the individual named as reflected in the records of the

UNRECORDED  
1-25-54

Commission. The Director has requested this matter be handled as soon as possible and the Commission should be asked to afford this check immediate attention and furnish the results at the earliest possible date.

1607

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: January 29,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - General

During the past week, 119 new cards were added to the Security Index and 18 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 101 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,334.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

1607X

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: January 29,  
1954

FROM :

115 SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX VERIFICATION PROJECT

General

SYNOPSIS:

New York Office has completed 90-day trial period of utilizing special squad of 19 men to verify residence and/or employment of subjects of closed Security Index cases. Procedure approved by Executives' Conference on 12-19-52, although actual inception by New York Office deferred until early October 1953 because of manpower considerations. New York advises that in past 90 days, 1,603 verifications have been made by the squad and that of the 1,197 cases presently assigned, only 45 have been assigned for a period of six months or longer due to difficulties in verifying. Above figure of 45 represents considerable decrease according to New York, which expresses approval of procedure and states that it will continue pending receipt of contrary instructions. Advantages re-stated; suggested that disadvantage of "specialization" be minimized by instruction to New York to rotate Agent assignments to the verification squad.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the New York Office be authorized to continue the use of the verification squad for an additional 90 days.

(2) That to allow more definitive analysis of its operations, New York be instructed to advise in detail of verifications handled in the interim, the number pending, the number assigned for verification for a period exceeding 45 days, and specific comment as to any additional advantages or disadvantages perceived in the ensuing 90-day period.

(3) That to prevent tendency to "specialize," the Agents be assigned to such squad for only six months.

Subject to your approval, there is attached a letter to New York embodying the above recommendations.

DETAILS:

You will recall that with the approval of the Executives' Conference, Bulet of 12-29-52 authorized the New York Office to form a special squad to handle the semiannual, but staggered, verifications of the residence and employment of Security Index subjects.

You will also recall that based on manpower considerations noted in New York letters of 1-16-53, 3-26-53, 5-28-53 and 9-22-53, the actual initiation of the project, utilizing a special squad of Agents was deferred until October 1953. By letter of 10-5-53 New York advised that such a squad had been established and was in operation, responsible to one supervisor and within Section 12 of the New York Office.

Bulet of 10-15-53 instructed the New York Office to advise of its recommendations as to the efficiency of the project at the expiration of 90 days.

Accomplishments to Date

Attached are two New York letters of 1-18-54, one of which bears the caption "Security Index Verification Project" and presents a resume of the accomplishments of the special squad since its inception. It is stated that (1) the squad has assigned to it 19 Agents and six clerical employees; (2) the squad has made 1,603 verifications, which figure is expected to increase; (3) there are 1,197 cases assigned for verification, of which only 45 have been assigned for a period of six months or longer due to difficulties in verifying either employment or residence, or both, of those subjects; (4) the Agents on the special

squad have no cases assigned to them, although they are responsible for developing informants under the Security Informant Program, and (5) verifications of residence and employment of subjects of pending cases are handled by the Agents to whom those cases are assigned, rather than by the special squad.

It was noted that the six clerical employees, noted previously, include those engaged in the maintenance of the Security Index on an over-all basis, including the filing of new and corrected cards, preparation of the forms utilized in verifications (FD-154), and the typing of Forms FD-122 for transmittal to the Bureau to amend existing Security Index cards.

The attached New York letter captioned "Security Index Verifications" notes that of the 5,480 Security Index subjects in the New York Office as of 1-13-54, 4,283 such cases were in a current status insofar as verification of residence and employment were concerned.

New York states that the formation of the verification squad has proved extremely beneficial and that it will continue in operation pending receipt of contrary instructions from the Bureau.

#### Analysis of Project

It may be noted that Bulet of 12-29-52, mentioned previously, in originally authorizing the institution of the verification squad on a trial basis, requested the New York Office to submit at the end of the first three months of operation of the special squad (1) recommendations as to its efficiency; (2) in tabular form, production statistics; (3) comparative delinquency figures and (4) advantages and disadvantages. 11/18/54

A review of the attached New York letter dealing with the project reflects that it is in substantial compliance with the foregoing instructions. It fails, however, to specifically compare their present delinquency in verifications with that existing prior to the inception of the special squad. Since, as you know, these cases are not opened administratively for the periodic verifications, the delay in making verifications is not reflected in the office records as are pending active matters. Under such circumstances the term "delinquency" is

subject to definition. It would appear that by analogy, and in the interest of uniformity, the verifications outstanding and assigned to the special squad for a period of 45 days or over should be considered delinquent for the purpose indicated in the above Bulet of 12-29-52.

In this connection, as noted previously, New York has stated that only 45 cases have been assigned for verification for a period of six months or longer and that the figure of 45 is considerably less than that any previously reported (semi-annually to the Bureau) in connection with their Security Index verifications. It may be observed that the New York Office has listed no additional advantages or disadvantages of the special squad, presumably because none became apparent which were not treated specifically by the New York Office in originally suggesting the establishment of the verification squad. ( )

Observations:

It appears desirable to re-state briefly the advantages considered by the Executives' Conference on 12-19-52 in approving for a trial period the establishment of the special squad:

1. One Agent would handle a large number of verifications in one area, saving considerable transportation time.
2. It would reduce the commoner types of pretexts and lessen the possibility of a pretext backfiring.
3. Increased production - anticipated development of various techniques and sources of information would expedite matters.
4. Reduces administrative problems and simplifies fixing of supervisory responsibility.
5. Serves as a training groundwork toward more complicated security work.

The disadvantages considered included:

1. Since each Agent so assigned would handle a large number of subject cases, he would have

to review the file each time he rechecked each subject, because he would be unable to remember the details of so many cases.

2. It would limit the Agent's experience in handling regular investigative matters and in writing reports.

3. The assignments would be monotonous and tends toward over-specialization.

It would appear that all three of the disadvantages listed above might be minimized to a great extent by rotation of the Agents assigned to the verification squad for a period of six months. Such practice would preclude use of Agents to such specialized assignment for protracted periods, yet allows Agents to use to advantage for a reasonable time the particular knowledge and instructions attendant to the verification processes. This observation is embodied in the form of an instruction to the New York Office and is set out in the attached letter to the New York Office, mentioned on page one, herein.

In consideration of the expressed approval of the verification squad by the New York Office as set out in the attached letter, it is believed that it should be continued. In order that its operation may be studied with the thought of possibly extending the use of such procedure to other of our larger offices, it would appear desirable to instruct the New York Office to report on their progress and accomplishments in verifications at 90-day intervals. Such instructions are also embodied in the attached letter to New York, mentioned on page one, herein.

WPA FILE  
1-29-54

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

January 29, 1954

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES  
**FBI File**

You are referred to my memorandum of January 7, 1954, wherein I listed fifteen individuals considered potentially dangerous to the national security who were at that time employed by the Federal Government. That memorandum noted that those fifteen individuals were listed for apprehension in the event of an emergency and that their names were maintained in the Security Index. Please be advised that since the submission of reference communication, the following individual has been designated for inclusion in the Security Index:

*UNRECORDED*

Director, FBI

1/18/54

SAC, New York

SECURITY INDEX VERIFICATION PROJECT

*CKT*  
*General*  
Re NY letter 10/5/53, Bulet 10/15/53, and NY  
Air-Tel 1/15/54, all with respect to the establishment of a  
separate squad in the NYO for the handling of Security Index  
verifications.

As noted in NY letter of 10/5/53, a separate squad  
of twenty agents was set up in the NYO for the handling of  
SI verifications under the supervision of SA  
effective 10/19/53. At the present time this unit  
has assigned to it nineteen agents and six clerical employees.  
The agents have no cases assigned to them although they are  
responsible for developing informants under the Security  
Informant Program, as are all agents handling security work.

Since the institution of this squad, there have  
been a number of projects in connection with the Security  
Index which have been handled almost exclusively by the agents  
on this squad. Statistics reflect that during the pertinent  
period 1,603 verifications were made by this unit. Production  
records show with the decrease in the number of SI projects  
the production of the individual agent has increased.

As of 1/13/54, there were 5,480 individuals listed  
in the NY Security Index, which is an increase of 604 subjects  
since the SI Squad was formed. With the continued emphasis  
on security investigations in the NYO, it is anticipated  
that the number of people placed on the SI will constantly  
increase so that there should be about 6,000 subjects on the  
SI in the next few months.

A review of the ticklers on SI verifications  
indicates that there are 1,197 cases assigned for verification  
at the present time, of which only 45 have been assigned for  
a period of six months or longer. This latter figure is  
considerably less than any previously reported by the NYO  
in connection with this project. It is noted that the agents  
do not handle verifications of SI subjects of pending cases  
which are done by the agents to whom the cases are assigned.

UNRECORDED  
1-18-54

Letter to Director, FBI  
NY

Statistics maintained with respect to the clerical work of this unit indicate that during the period 10/16/53 through 1/13/54 the following were handled:

New SI cards received from Bureau	612
FD-154 verification forms	3,150
FD-122s typed	1,424
Corrected SI cards received from Bureau	1,715

The formation of this squad has been extremely beneficial to the efficient handling of this project. This squad will continue in operation UACB.

UNRECORDED

SAC, New York ( )

February 1, 1954

Director, FBI ( )

**SECURITY INDEX VERIFICATION PROJECT**

Bulletin of January 18, 1954, containing  
an analysis of captioned project, based on the first  
90 days of its operation.

You are authorized to continue utilization  
of the special squad of agents in connection with  
this project for an additional period of 90 days at  
the end of which time you are instructed to submit  
the results of its accomplishments in line with the  
comments set out hereinafter.

Relet notes that from a review of your  
tickler on Security Index verifications you have  
presently assigned 1,137 cases, of which 45 have been  
assigned for a period of six months or longer. You  
point out that the latter figure is "considerably  
less than any previously reported by the New York  
Office in connection with this project." The Bureau  
desires that you determine the analogous figure as  
it existed at the time captioned project was  
instituted in order that the efficiency of your  
special squad may be more accurately ascertained.

In addition, your resume at the end of  
the next 90-day period should include figures  
relating to the following items, pertaining to the  
90-day period following the submission of relets:

1. Total number of verifications handled.
2. The number of cases in which  
verifications are pending.
3. The number of cases assigned for  
verification for a period exceeding  
45 days.
4. Specific comments as to any additional  
advantages or disadvantages perceived  
in the operation of this project.

UNRECORDED  
2-1-54

One of the objections to the operation of a squad of this type lies in the fact that the work is specialized. Agents so engaged have no opportunity to write reports or conduct more diverse types of investigations in the security field. For this reason, it appears wholly undesirable to assign Agents to this squad for a period exceeding six months. If, in submitting your resume of this project at the end of 30 days, you recommend its continuance, you are instructed to take appropriate steps to provide for the rotation of Agents assigned to the verification squad. The facts that such assignments have been made should be specifically noted in your letter.

1608

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 5,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - Continued

During the past week, 121 new cards were added to the Security Index and 14 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 107 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,441.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

1609

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. [REDACTED]

(M)

DATE: December 28,  
1953

FROM : Mr. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: USE OF REMOTE-CONTROLLED CAMERAS,  
SUGGESTION OF SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]  
SAVANNAH OFFICE  
(SUGGESTION NO. 874-53)

Security, To: [REDACTED]

Under date of December 17, 1953, Special Agent  
Thompson submitted the above suggestion.

Briefly, Special Agent [REDACTED] suggests that con-  
sideration be given to the development and utilization of  
a remote-controlled camera using a telephoto lens. It is  
pointed out that such an arrangement could be effected by  
combining cameras currently in bureau use with a remote-  
controlled apparatus available at the relatively modest  
cost of about \$50.00.

The suggested arrangement would permit the establish-  
ment of a disguised camera near a fixed location, such as a  
doorway, where persons whose photographs are desired might  
pass, without the necessity of having personnel operating  
the camera in the immediate vicinity. This would, of course,  
provide greater security and reduce the possibility of  
subjects becoming suspicious.

During investigations involving the Communist Party  
underground apparatus, espionage subjects, and possibly in  
occasional criminal investigations, it is believed that  
situations do arise in which the use of a remote-controlled  
camera would be of distinct value. However, it would appear  
that such would be an abnormal rather than a normal technique.

Of course, the possibility exists that: (1) the  
suggestion is not technically feasible; or (2) that the cost  
would be prohibitive.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That subject to the considerations in the  
paragraph immediately above, the suggestion receive favorable  
action.

(2) That the Laboratory be requested to submit its  
views.

REFERRED TO: [REDACTED]

QH:15

[REDACTED] QT:NH

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1610

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: January 8, 1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION OF SA ██████████, SAVANNAH OFFICE, REGARDING REMOTE-CONTROLLED CAMERAS  
SUGGESTION #874-53

Re suggestion of SA ██████████, Savannah office, dated 12-17-53, that the Bureau consider the use of remote control equipment in connection with the use of the Robot camera on surveillances.

A remote-controlled camera would be entirely feasible and could be of assistance in some situations, especially on surveillances where the camera equipment can be hidden close enough to photograph the subject at the agents observing would be too far away.

The essential unit would consist of a 12 volt battery operated remote control release commercially available for the Robot camera at a cost of \$39.50. The release mechanism would have to be operated by a wire connection which would be feasible in some situations if the agents would not have to be too far away and the wires could be concealed.

The remote control release could also be operated by a radio transmitter-receiver unit as suggested by SA ██████████. However, the cost of this unit is estimated by the Laboratory to be between \$400 and \$500 rather than \$50 as stated in referenced suggestion. The Laboratory feels the \$50 unit suggested by SA ██████████ would not be adequate and dependable for this purpose.

The Laboratory could build a compact portable remote-controlled camera unit for use in smaller offices where Robot camera-equipped panel trucks are not available. This portable unit would consist of the Robot camera with remote control release and battery built into a box with sufficient wiring for connection to a nearby observation post. It would be necessary to purchase the remote control release.

RECOMMENDATION: That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division for appropriate attention.

CC: Mr. ██████████

██████████ FEB 6 1954  
██████████

██████████ QT:vl

RW  
REC'D

MA

161

December 30, 1953

SUGGESTION #874-53  
MADE BY SPECIAL AGENT  
[REDACTED] OF  
THE SAVANNAH OFFICE

The Investigative Division does not recommend the use of a camera of the Robot type for general investigative activity. In special type cases, the use of this equipment would possibly be of value.

P.S.  
PAC

RJM

Circ Confidential  
1/20/54 Clegg

1611  
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. [REDACTED]

DATE: 1/26/54

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #874-53  
MADE BY [REDACTED]  
SPECIAL AGENT, SAVANNAH OFFICE

[REDACTED] Clegg, [REDACTED]

Clegg



937

SUGGESTION:

The suggesting employee points out that one of the problems involved in handling Security-type cases is the photographing of subjects and suspects, often on the street or entering or leaving meeting places.

The procedure used at present generally involves use of a telephoto-lens camera located in a plant from which the spot to be photographed is in clear view or through the use of a surveillance truck. The location of a suitable plant is a problem which often becomes unsurmountable within the time available, and at times it is not desirable to use a surveillance truck.

It is suggested that a camera of the Robot type, which takes up to twenty pictures with one winding, or a motion picture camera be utilized in such instances and remotely controlled by radio.

The employee has in mind the camera with radio receiver and transmitter which may be disguised in a box with suitable camera lens openings and placed in a parked car near the spot to be photographed. When an individual in whom the Bureau is interested comes within view a photograph can be taken by pressing a button on the transmitter which may be located more than a block away. The transmitter operator may observe the point of interest through binoculars. Transmitters and receivers for such remote operation are available in kit form from several radio supply houses for approximately \$50 per kit. SA Thompson pointed out that this procedure could also be used to photograph extortion and ransom payoffs where a particular meeting place is designated, and for meetings of double agents in espionage and security cases where suitable cover for other type physical surveillance is nonexistent.

OBSERVATIONS:

SAC [REDACTED] of Savannah does not recommend this procedure as a general practice, but commented this might be arranged in a [REDACTED] case under unusual circumstances.

The Investigative Division does not recommend use of cameras of the Robot type for general investigative activity; however, in special type cases they believe the use of this equipment would prove effective. Mgr. Clegg

Memorandum to Mr. [redacted]

be of value.

The Domestic Intelligence Division believes that during investigations involving Communist Party Underground apparatus, Espionage subjects, and possibly in occasional criminal investigation situations do arise in which the use of a remotely controlled camera would be of distinct value. However, they point out such would be an abnormal rather than a normal technique.

The FBI Laboratory believes a remote-controlled camera would be entirely feasible and could be of assistance in some situations, especially on surveillances where the camera equipment can be hidden close enough to photograph the subject, but the agents observing would be too far away. The essential unit would consist of a 12-volt battery operated remote control release commercially available for the Robot camera at a cost of \$39.50. The release mechanism would have to be operated by a wire connection which would be feasible in some situations if the agents would not have to be too far away and the wires could be concealed. The remote control release could also be operated by a radio transmitter-receiver unit as suggested by SA Thompson. The cost of this unit is estimated by the Laboratory to be between \$400 and \$500, rather than \$50, as stated by the suggesting employee. The Laboratory feels that the \$50 unit suggested would not be adequate and dependable for the purpose intended.

The Laboratory could build a compact portable remote-controlled camera unit for use in smaller offices where Robot camera equipped panel trucks are not available. This portable unit would consist of the Robot camera with remote control release and battery built into a box with sufficient wiring for connection to a nearby observation post. It would be necessary to purchase the remote control release.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

On January 25, 1954, the Conference consisting of Messrs. [redacted] considered the above suggestion. Because of the fact that there is no indicated need that such type of equipment would have any normal use and could only be used in extremely exceptional cases, the Conference is unanimously of the opinion that such equipment should not be made. QT:VH

✓

1612

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: January 22,  
1954

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: *Executive, Jan. 21, 1954*  
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS (m)

On January 21, 1954, the Executives' Conference consisting of Messrs.

considered the Bureau's present policy of preparation of summary reports and whether it should be continued.

Bureau Bulletin No. 40, Series 1947, dated July 23, 1947, stated that in all cases involving possibility of prosecution, a summary report should be prepared regardless of the brevity of investigative reports or prior number of investigative reports prepared.

On December 1, 1950, the Executives' Conference recommended unanimously the suggestion that the preparation of summary reports be discontinued, except in complicated major cases and when, in the opinion of the SAC or the Bureau, a summary report should be prepared. The Director approved and Bureau Bulletin No. 68, Series 1950, dated December 7, 1950, states that "regular requirements for submission of prosecutive and investigative summary reports are hereby rescinded." Prosecutive summaries would be submitted only in major or complicated cases and upon specific instructions of the SAC or the Bureau. Section 4(d) of the Manual of Rules and Regulations so states and further states that non-prosecutive summary reports are prepared by the office of origin upon specific instructions of the SAC or the Bureau and upon publication of an Identification Order on a subject.

Arguments Favoring Present Policy:

(1) Summary reports are only prepared on instructions of the SAC or the Bureau when a need for same is apparent in a complicated or major case.

(2) In such cases the summary report insures that the case has been worked thoroughly; that all leads have been covered; and that the case has been thoroughly reviewed.

(3) The summary report pin-points any weaknesses in the investigation which can then be corrected. It also pin-points the case from a prosecutive standpoint.

MEMORANDUM FOR

(4) While the Bureau is not in the business of preparing trial briefs for the United States Attorney, nevertheless the United States Attorney is more likely to prosecute a case if the facts are clearly and succinctly set forth, as in a prosecutive summary. Therefore, it follows that our statistics are increased through the use of prosecutive summaries.

Disadvantages:

(1) The preparation of summary reports is time consuming on the part of the Agent and the clerical staff of the Bureau.

(2) Investigative summaries are prepared for use within the Bureau. Prosecutive summaries, while of assistance from an investigative standpoint, are also of considerable assistance to the United States Attorney. We should not be in the business of preparing summaries for prosecution, as such.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended continuance of the investigative and prosecutive summaries under our present restricted policy, that is, restricted to those cases where the Bureau or the SAC feels that the case is of such a nature as to require a summary report.

Summary Reports in Security Index Cases:

A program to prepare summary reports in all Security Index cases was instituted by SAC Letter No. 95, Series 1951, dated September 22, 1951. After preparation of a summary report each case is reopened each year thereafter for preparation of an auxiliary summary report. As of January 1, 1954, thirty-one field offices have completed the initial summary reports in these cases. The remaining offices with the exception of New York will complete the program by July 14, 1954. Due to security backlog and delinquency in New York, the program has been suspended in that office, although New York does submit summaries on new cases and, therefore, has submitted 1,769 summary reports. The program will be resumed in New York as soon as circumstances permit.

MEMORANDUM FORExecutives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended continuation of the Security Index summary report program for the following reasons:

(1) Each case on which a summary report is submitted must be thoroughly reviewed, both in the field and at the Bureau to insure that the basis for placing the individual on the Security Index is sound. In view of our responsibilities under the Security Index Program, it is essential that each case be most carefully evaluated.

(2) In the event of an emergency, we will be in a position to furnish the summary reports to the United States Attorney for action. The Bureau would be simply unable to prepare such reports during an emergency. Therefore, it is imperative that we prepare them in advance.

*UNRECORDED*

*January 28,  
1954*

**PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES**

*Bufile*

You will recall that by letters of 9-16-53 and 1-7-54, we transmitted to the Attorney General the names of those individuals in federal employment who were as of those dates included in our Security Index.

On 1-19-54, the name of , an employee of the U. S. Post Office Department in , Minnesota, was added to the Security Index and steps were taken to advise the Attorney General in line with our previous communications mentioned above.

Regarding , the Director has asked "Have we sent reports to the Civil Service Commission or the Post Office Department." Our files reflect that was the subject of Loyalty of Government Employees investigation in 1952. By letter of 10-22-52, four copies of each loyalty report submitted by the field were transmitted to , Investigations Division, U. S. Civil Service Commission. On the same date, single copies of the loyalty reports were forwarded to Assistant Attorney General . In addition, a supplemental report under the loyalty caption was disseminated by letters of 1-10-53, four copies to and one copy to , both mentioned above.

In accordance with procedure in the administration of Executive Orders 9835 and 10450, the reports of investigation in Loyalty of Government Employees and Security of Government Employees cases were and are transmitted to the Civil Service Commission for information and forwarding to the employing agency, in this case the Post Office Department.

**ACTION:**

Subject to your approval, there is attached a letter to the Attorney General advising that is to be included in the list of Security Index subjects employed by the Federal Government.

# Office Memorandum • UNITE S GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUMMARY REPORTS

DATE: February 2,  
1954

SYNOPSIS:  
This memorandum prepared to further analyze Bureau's policy regarding preparation of summary reports.

Investigative Division: Prosecutive summary reports submitted in major and complicated cases upon specific instruction of SAC or the Bureau and in nonprosecutive cases by office of origin upon specific instruction of SAC or the Bureau and upon publication of an Identification Order. Two-day survey, January 28 and 29, 1954, reflected Investigative Division received one prosecutive summary and six nonprosecutive summaries during those days.

Domestic Intelligence Division: Prosecutive summaries prepared in espionage, Smith Act, and fraud cases when considered for prosecution and in front organization cases when considered for presentation to Subversive Activities Control Board. Such reports necessary to include only admissible evidence for consideration at hearings. In a very limited number of cases, summary reports prepared in Espionage Section in complicated cases in order to better evaluate the progress of the case. During two-day survey, January 28 and 29, 1954, one prosecutive and two nonprosecutive summaries received by Espionage Section. During same period, Internal Security Section received three prosecutive summaries and 133 nonprosecutive summary reports. Nonprosecutive summaries received under Security Index program. All offices (except New York) under instructions to prepare initial summary report in all Security Index cases by July 14, 1954. Thirteen offices have completed initial summaries in all cases. On January 1954, twenty-one offices reported 4,702 summaries to be prepared by deadline date. Of those, 3,268 reported by Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Los Angeles now using equivalent of 99 Agents on summary reports; San Francisco, 25 Agents; Chicago, 34 Agents; and Philadelphia, 21 Agents. Statistics on each office set out in memorandum.

ACTION: The Investigative Division and the Espionage and Internal Security Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Division recommend present Bureau policy concerning preparation of summary reports.

be continued. Specific reasons for the recommendations are set out under Sections I and II of this memorandum.

DETAILS:

This memorandum is prepared to further analyze the Bureau's position in regard to the preparation of prosecutive and nonprosecutive summary reports. It is broken down to consider summary reports prepared in cases handled by the (I) Investigative Division and the (II) Domestic Intelligence Division.

I. INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Under present instructions, prosecutive summaries are submitted only in major and complicated cases and upon specific instructions of the SAC or the Bureau. Nonprosecutive summary reports are prepared by the office of origin upon specific instructions of the SAC or the Bureau and upon publication of an Identification Order on a subject.

During January 28 and 29, 1954, a total of 7 summary reports were received at the Bureau by all Supervisors assigned to the Investigative Division. The summary reports were broken down as follows:

Nonprosecutive summaries - 6; total pages 175.

Prosecutive summaries - 1; total pages 10.

Recommendation of the Investigative Division:

It is recommended that the practice of submitting prosecutive and nonprosecutive summary reports in complicated and major criminal cases be continued in accordance with present Bureau instructions for the following reasons:

- (1) Eliminates lengthy conferences before and during trial with U. S. Attorney.
- (2) Requires Agent to review case to insure all necessary evidence has been obtained.
- (3) Reports are of assistance to Supervisors in the field and at Bureau to check completeness of investigation, particularly where file is voluminous.
- (4) Serves as ready reference (trial brief) for the U. S. Attorney's use.
- (5) Reports should spur U. S. Attorney into early trial whereas in absence of these reports he may seek numerous postponements.
- (6) By reason of above, cases should result in higher percentage of convictions.

II. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

A. Espionage, Smith Act, Front Organizations, and Fraud Cases

Summary reports prepared in security-type cases are, for the most part, nonprosecutive rather than prosecutive summaries. Prosecutive-type summary reports have been prepared in the espionage, Smith Act, and fraud cases considered for prosecutive action and in front organization cases

Part 1-2

considered for presentation to the Subversive Activities Control Board under the Internal Security Act of 1950. In the Smith Act cases, all summary reports have been prepared except supplemental summaries, which are prepared when sufficient additional derogatory information has been developed. As additional front organization cases are considered for presentation to the Department for an opinion or when the Department specifically makes a request, summary reports are prepared.

In all of the types of cases mentioned above considered for prosecution or presentation to the Subversive Activities Control Board, it is necessary to prepare summary reports to include only admissible-type evidence excluding information obtained from highly confidential or anonymous sources that is inadmissible.

#### B. Summary Reports Received in Espionage Section

As pointed out above, the Espionage Section has certain cases considered for prosecution in which it is necessary to prepare summary reports in order to include only the admissible evidence. In addition, certain espionage cases are included in the Security Index in which summary reports are prepared in accordance with all Security Index cases, covered more fully hereinafter. Also, the Espionage Section, in a very limited number of cases in complicated and involved espionage investigations, requests the field to prepare summary reports in order to re-evaluate and consider the whole progress of the case.

During January 28 and 29, 1954, a total of 3 summary reports were received by all Supervisors in the Espionage Section. These reports are broken down as follows:

SI Cases { Non Prosecutive summary reports - 1; total pages 4.  
                  Nonprosecutive summary reports - 2; total pages 129.

C. Summary Reports Received in the Internal Security Section

The total number of reports received by all Supervisors in the Internal Security Section for the two-day period January 28 and 29, 1954, is set out as follows:

<del>Supplement</del> = Smithed {   FAG { \$I { 	Prosecutive summary reports - 3; total pages 37. Nonprosecutive summary reports - 133; total pages 1,394.
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D. Summary Reports in Security Index Cases

The program to prepare summary reports in all Security Index cases was initiated by SAC Letter Number 95 dated September 22, 1951. After preparation of the initial summary report, each case is reopened each year thereafter for preparation of either an investigative report or a summary report. A supplemental summary report is prepared at that time if sufficient material has been developed. SAC Letter Number 53-48 dated July 14, 1953, instructed all offices except New York to complete the initial summary reports in all Security Index cases by July 14, 1954.

Due to the backlog and delinquency in the New York Office in security investigations, the summary report program has been suspended in New York, although New York does submit summary reports in cases when names are being added to the Security Index or when office of origin is being transferred to another field division. The latest available statistics indicate the New York Office has submitted approximately 1,769 summary reports and as of January 15, 1954, New York had 5,838 names in their Security Index.

Thirty field offices have completed the initial summary reports in their Security Index cases. As of January 1, 1954, the remaining twenty-one offices (New York excluded) reported that 4,702 summaries had to be prepared by July 14, 1954. That estimate included only cases in which the subject's Security Index card is in the Special Section of the Security Index, cases in which no subversive derogatory information has been submitted in report form since January 1,

1949, and all other routine Security Index cases. It did not include cases in which names are being added to the Security Index, cases in which a Security Index subject is being tabbed as an employee of a key facility, and key figure and top functionary cases.

As of January 1, 1954, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Chicago reported a total of 3,268 summary reports to be prepared out of the 4,702 summary reports mentioned above. The following data in this matter pertaining to these four offices is set out as follows:

Los Angeles

Los Angeles does not have Agents exclusively assigned to the preparation of summary reports. Los Angeles estimates that it takes an average of six days for an Agent to prepare a summary report.

Los Angeles estimates that 72 Agents are devoting three fourths of their time to summary reports; 49 Agents assigned to undercover investigations, front groups, Toplev, etc., are spending approximately one third of their time; and 115 Agents assigned to other than security squads are assigned one summary report per month and as a result are devoting approximately one fourth of their time to this program. Los Angeles estimates that approximately 496 Agent days per week are presently being devoted to preparing summary reports. That estimate represents the assignment of approximately 99 Agents per week to this project.

Los Angeles advised on January 29, 1954, that 1,648 initial summary reports in routine cases need to be prepared by July 14, 1954, plus three in key figure cases or a total of 1,651.

In this connection, it is to be noted that the number of Agent days being devoted to this project at this time has been recently increased because of Bureau instructions

\* ANY case added to S.I. - The initial report is a summary report. Also summary is prepared when person is employed by a key facility

that the July 14, 1954, deadline in this matter be met. It is to be noted that according to figures submitted by Los Angeles between July 1, 1953, and January 1, 1954, the Los Angeles Office prepared approximately 98 summary reports in Security Index cases other than those falling in the categories of cases being added to the Security Index, key facility cases, and key figure and top functionary cases.

San Francisco

San Francisco does not have Agents assigned exclusively to the preparation of summary reports. San Francisco estimates it takes an Agent approximately six days to prepare a summary report but points out that many of their remaining initial summaries are in multivolume files and will take more than six days.

San Francisco estimates that approximately 125 Agent days per week are devoted to the preparation of summary reports. This represents 25 Agents per week on this type of work. San Francisco, as of January 29, 1954, reported that approximately 539 initial summary reports need to be prepared to meet the deadline of July 14, 1954. For your information, between July 1, 1953, and January 1, 1954, according to data furnished by San Francisco, approximately 428 summary reports were submitted by that office in categories other than where new names are being added to the Security Index, key facility cases, and key figure and top functionary cases.

Chicago

Chicago has 23 Agents assigned to a summary report squad. However, this squad also prepares key facility six-months reports, works on plant informant and American Legion cases, works on Gwinn Amendment cases involving prosecutive summaries, investigates missing Security Index subjects except key figures and top functionaries, and conducts interviews of Security Index subjects.

Chicago estimates it takes approximately 12.4 days for one Agent to prepare a summary report. Chicago estimates that at this time 170 Agent days per week are utilized in the summary report program or approximately 34 of their Agents are so assigned.

On January 29, 1954, Chicago advised that 384 routine initial summary reports and 57 summary reports in key figure cases or a total of 440 summaries need to be completed by the July 14, 1954, deadline. Between July 1, 1953, and January 1, 1954, according to figures submitted by Chicago, 336 summary reports were prepared in cases in categories other than adding names to the Security Index, key facility, key figure and top functionary cases.

Philadelphia

As of January 6, 1954, Philadelphia reported 509 summary reports (including 21 key figure cases) needed to be submitted by the July 14, 1954, deadline.

Philadelphia estimates that it takes five Agent days to prepare a summary report in routine cases and two or three times as much time in voluminous key figure cases. Philadelphia reported that 21 Agents are to be used full time on the preparation of summary reports after Jan 23, 1954.

On January 6, 1954, Philadelphia advised that 133 initial summary reports had been submitted during October, November, and December, 1953.

Recommendation of the Espionage and Internal Security Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Divisions:

It is the recommendation of the Espionage and Internal Security Sections that the summary reports in espionage and security cases be continued for the following reasons:

- (1) In cases where prosecution is being considered in any security-type case including espionage, Smith Act, or fraud cases, it is necessary to prepare summary reports to include only admissible evidence to be considered in the prosecution inasmuch as other security reports prepared previously in such cases include information from highly confidential or anonymous sources.

(2) In front organization cases summary reports are necessary to include only admissible evidence for use before the Subversive Activities Control Board for the same reason as indicated under 1 above.

(3) Summary reports in Security Index cases are necessary because:

(a) Each Security Index case on which a summary report is submitted must be thoroughly reviewed both in the field and at the Bureau to insure that continuing sound basis exists for maintaining the name on the Security Index. Since the Department is no longer reviewing all of our Security Index cases, it is extremely important that each case be carefully evaluated with the preparation of the summary report.

(b) Information in many Security Index cases has been accumulated over many years. In the preparation of the summary report, it is necessary to document the location in the office files of the original reports containing the derogatory information. Such information has been received over the years from confidential informants, anonymous sources, etc. By locating and documenting all pertinent data at this time, the information will be readily available for use of hearing boards in an emergency.

(c) By having summary reports prepared in Security Index cases at this time, we will be in a position to furnish reports to United States Attorneys in an emergency without delay. Because of the number of persons now on the Security Index (24,334), it would be impossible to bring all cases up to date in an emergency in a reasonable time.

It is imperative that we prepare them in advance. At the time of an emergency, we will have many other responsibilities and report writing to bring these cases up to date should be kept at an absolute minimum if possible.

(d) Once the initial summary report has been completed, the problem of a yearly review must, of necessity, be continued to keep on top of these cases. Less work will be needed to bring a case up to date each year after the initial summary report has been prepared. After such yearly review, a report will have to be submitted whether or not it is a summary. Consequently, even if the summary report program were to be discontinued, it would not release all Agents working on these cases since personnel will be needed to keep each case up to date each year.

(e) In view of the importance of the Security Index program in an emergency in maintaining the internal security, I believe the summary report program is the most effective way to bring this work into line and to keep it in line. The program is well along and it appears that all offices except New York will be able to complete the project of submitting initial summary reports in each case by July 14, 1954, under our present plans.

(4) In a very limited number of espionage cases which are complicated and involved, even though the subject's name is not included in the Security Index, the Espionage Section believes it very necessary that summary reports be prepared to better evaluate and consider the whole progress of the case.

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 2,  
1954

FROM :

(m)

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORTS

In response to your inquiry, investigative summary reports are prepared either on the initiative of the field or at the request of the Bureau in the following instances:

1. In complicated investigations which may involve numerous subjects or several related violations or where the elements of the violation to be established are complicated or extremely important. In such instances it is frequently necessary or desirable to bring together in one report all of the information developed to date in order to correlate it, weed out what is irrelevant and unimportant, and to evaluate the current status of the investigation in order that its future direction may be decided.

2. Extended investigations involving cases which have extended over a period of months and years with the submission of many reports and the accumulation of a voluminous file. In such instances it is frequently important that the entire file be carefully reviewed in order that the pertinent information can be summarized. This is frequently true in fugitive investigations or in bank robbery investigations and similar matters where it is necessary to take stock of the investigation conducted to date in order to determine the course of the further lines of inquiry which should be pursued. This is especially true where a review of the file is to be made for the purpose of setting out leads for additional offices which have not previously engaged in investigation in the case in order to furnish them full background information for use in connection with their interviews. It is also of use in those cases where it is desired to evaluate the evidence accumulated to prove the various elements of the offense so that shortcomings in any particular may be corrected through additional investigation.

In general, investigative summary reports are prepared to reduce to brief, concise form for the use of the Bureau and the various field divisions all of the pertinent facts relating to a particular investigation. This assists in evaluating the results obtained to date, discovering weaknesses in the investigation previously conducted, and outlining the course of future investigation.

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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 3, 1954

Director, FBI

**PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION  
OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES  
FBI File**

Reference is made to previous communications under the above caption, including my memoranda of January 7 and 29, 1954, regarding individuals in Federal employment who are included in the Security Index, designated for apprehension in the event of a national emergency.

Please be advised that , a Security Index subject, has recently been employed by the Treasury Department, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Washington, D. C.

is presently the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order 10450, the results of which will be disseminated promptly upon completion to the Civil Service Commission and the Department in accordance with existing procedures.

Investigative reports on , bearing the character " have been forwarded previously to the Records Administration Branch of the Department.

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: February 12,  
1954

FROM

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely on the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security Matter and foreign intelligence cases in classifications 60, 100 and 105. Status of these cases as of January 31, 1954, is set forth herein.

Number of pending active matters in the entire field increased slightly from 19,947 to 20,520. The delinquent matters in the entire field increased from 6,749 to 7,494 and the delinquency increased from 33.2% to 36.5%. Letters being sent to 21 offices instructing them to reduce their backlog and delinquency. Of the 21 letters, seven are also requesting explanations for either the continuance of an upward trend or the failure to reduce prevailing high delinquency in the security cases. Such explanations have been requested of Boston, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Newark, New York and Philadelphia.

New York's pending active matters in the three classifications increased slightly from 5,115 to 5,144 and the number of delinquent from 2,187 to 2,732 to approximately 53%. New York accounts for approximately 25% of the pending active matters and 29.1% of the delinquency in these classifications in the entire field. New York reduced the number of pending active matters in the 100 classification from 4,355 to 4,331 although the number delinquent rose from 2,018 to 2,732, or from approximately 47% to 56%.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for approval are letters to Boston, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Newark, New York and Philadelphia, requesting explanations for their delinquent status, as noted in paragraph two, above.

Bufile [redacted]

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DETAILS:

As you know, since December 1951 we have been closely following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The January 1954, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the 65, 100 and 105 classifications increased during the month from 19,947 to 20,520. The number of delinquent matters increased from 6,749 to 7,494, representing a statistical increase from 33.2% to 36.5%. Nineteen offices reduced their total number of pending active matters and twenty-three offices reduced their delinquency in these classifications. Letters are being sent to 21 offices directing that to reduce their backlog and delinquency in these matters. Of the 21 letters, seven are also requesting explanations for either the continuance of an upward trend or the failure to reduce prevailing high delinquency in the security cases. Such explanations have been requested of Boston, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Newark, New York and Philadelphia.

The New York Office has approximately 25% of the pending active matters in the 65, 100 and 105 classifications in the entire field. That office has approximately 29.1% of the number of delinquent matters in these classifications in the entire field. The average delinquency in all other offices at the end of the month was approximately 36.5%. New York's delinquency increased from 43% to 53%.

The bulk of New York's backlog and delinquency is in the 100 classification. During January the number of pending active matters in the 100 classification in the New York Office was reduced

from 4,355 to 4,331. The number of such matters which were delinquent increased from 2,013 to 2,431. The delinquency in classification 100 increased from 47% to 56%.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

Classifications	<u>TOTAL PENDING MATTERS</u>				
	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>10-31-52</u>	<u>11-30-52</u>	<u>12-31-52</u>	<u>1-31-53</u>
65	1,314	1,103	1,118	1,155	1,116
100	32,812	20,151	20,882	20,941	21,153
105	2,825	2,002	2,041	2,070	2,265
Total	37,021	23,262	24,042	24,172	24,531

Classifications	<u>TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS</u>				
	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>10-31-52</u>	<u>11-30-52</u>	<u>12-31-52</u>	<u>1-31-53</u>
65	525	160	287	180	185
100	22,510	6,000	5,899	6,102	6,733
105	1,719	420	529	447	571
Total	24,762	6,580	6,655	6,749	7,406

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters, delinquency and forced close of delinquency of all offices since January 1, 1952.

CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105  
ALL FIELD EDITIONS

Date	Pending Active Matters	Delinquent Matters	Percentage Delinquent
1-31-53	24,098	11,772	48.8%
2-28-53	22,935	11,233	46.9%
3-31-53	23,033	10,890	47.3%
4-30-53	22,700	9,120	41.5%
5-31-53	21,740	9,730	44.8%
6-30-53	20,970	9,553	45.6%
7-31-53	20,180	9,411	46.6%
8-31-53	19,493	8,495	43.6%
9-30-53	19,224	7,571	39.4%
10-31-53	19,141	6,580	34.3%
11-30-53	19,833	6,655	33.5%
12-31-53	19,947	6,749	33.2%
1-31-54	20,520	7,494	36.5%

Status of Security Work In Twelve of the Larger Offices

The following statistics reflect the progress of the twelve larger offices we have been closely following since December 1951. These offices have approximately 80% of the total Security Index cards and a high percentage of the pending work and delinquency in classifications 65, 100 and 105.

STATISTICS FOR TWELVE OFFICES  
SECURITY INDEX COUNT AND PEND-  
ING ACTIVE MATTERS FOR  
65, 100 and 105 MATTERS

Office	Security Index Cards	Pending Active Matters		Percentage Delinquent	
	1-15-54	12-31-53	1-31-54	12-31-53	1-31-54
* New York	5,686	5,115	5,144	43%	53%
* Los Angeles	3,944	1,845	2,192	35%	20%
* San Francisco	2,179	1,652	1,523	47%	46%
* Chicago	1,490	967	1,011	25%	28%
* Detroit	1,378	725	648	30%	30%
* Philadelphia	1,112	1,023	981	38%	40%
* Newark	771	1,053	1,105	40%	42%
Cleveland	687	460	465	23%	25%
Seattle	675	306	388	25%	24%
* Boston	603	701	691	29%	30%
Minneapolis	515	370	358	22%	15%
* New Haven	502	450	452	23%	30%
Total	19,594	14,667	14,958		

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The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since June 30, 1952, are as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent (65-100-105)</u>
6-30-52	14,157	9,103	64.3%
7-31-52	13,117	7,965	60.7%
8-31-52	12,611	7,589	60.2%
9-30-52	11,367	5,732	50.4%
10-31-52	11,286	4,957	43.9%
11-30-52	11,148	4,844	43.5%
12-31-52	10,937	4,578	41.9%
1-31-53	10,780	4,696	43.8%
2-28-53	10,721	4,358	40.6%
3-31-53	10,069	4,019	39.8%
4-30-53	9,411	2,887	30.7%
5-31-53	9,277	3,447	37.2%
6-30-53	8,964	3,532	39.4%
7-31-53	6,908	3,759	42.8%
8-31-53	8,547	3,616	42.3%
9-30-53	8,601	3,249	37.8%
10-31-53	8,845	2,785	31.4%
11-30-53	9,434	2,871	30.4%
12-31-53	9,552	3,261	34.1%
1-31-54	9,814	3,318	33.8%

New York Office

In regard to the New York Office you will note it has the highest number of the pending active matters and the highest percentage of delinquency of the twelve offices listed. During January, the New York Office increased the number of pending active matters in classifications 65, 100 and 105 by 29 from 5,115 to 5,144 matters and those delinquent by 545 from 2,187 to 2,732.

During 1953, the New York Office made a steady reduction in delinquent matters in the security classifications as well as a steady reduction in the case backlog. During November, 1953, the security delinquency dropped below 50% for the first time in 1953 to 47%. This was reduced even further in December to 43%. The latter figure compares favorably with the January, 1953, delinquency of 70% in the security classifications.

During the past month, however, New York delinquency in the security classifications took an upward trend, as noted above. We are asking New York to advise as to the factors

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responsible for such increase and their plans for reducing delinquency.

Status of Security Work in the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on January 31, 1953, in total matters in classifications 65, 100 and 105. These statistics reflect the progress during January, 1954. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications 65 and 105 and their entire pending backlog is in classification 100 matters.

Office	Pending Active Letters		Percentage Delinquent	
	12-31-53	1-31-54	12-31-53	1-31-54
* Kansas City	94	86	31%	42%
* Albuquerque	86	108	24%	40%
* Little Rock	20	22	10%	39%
* Cincinnati	299	299	38%	35%
* Buffalo	209	252	25%	34%
* Milwaukee	214	222	27%	33%
* Baltimore	364	418	18%	32%
* Norfolk	30	38	23%	29%
San Juan	170	181	18%	28%
* St. Louis	232	262	24%	27%
* San Antonio	42	45	19%	26%
Pittsburgh	317	311	20%	26%
Washington Field	980	1,076	25%	26%
Albany	261	244	32%	25%
Knoxville	22	42	5%	25%
* Memphis	41	45	33%	25%
* Omaha	66	59	38%	25%
* Phoenix	79	80	24%	25%
Richmond	54	60	32%	25%
Salt Lake City	62	49	26%	25%
Denver	177	161	31%	24%
Louisville	44	46	9%	24%
Portland	78	93	26%	23%
Atlanta	55	73	35%	23%
Indianapolis	166	165	33%	22%
Birmingham	45	39	11%	21%
Mobile	33	34	12%	21%
Springfield	123	135	27%	20%
Miami	121	103	18%	19%
San Diego	191	164	18%	19%
Houston	56	45	25%	18%
Butte	46	49	35%	16%
Charlotte	53	65	28%	16%
New Orleans	116	113	19%	16%
Anchorage	42	40	21%	13%
Oklahoma City	74	69	32%	15%

<u>Office</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>		<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>		<u>cont'd</u>
	<u>12-31-53</u>	<u>1-31-54</u>	<u>12-31-53</u>	<u>1-31-54</u>	
Savannah	37	31	19%	12%	
Dallas	77	93	20%	10%	
El Paso	32	36	0%	0%	
Honolulu	62	44	6%	0%	
Total	5,280	5,562			

\* Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status as of 1-31-54. See page eight herein.

During January, fifteen offices were able to reduce their pending active work load and twenty offices reduced their delinquency.

The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since June 30, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
6-30-52	8,417	3,842	45.6%
7-31-52	7,776	3,156	40.6%
8-31-52	6,928	3,054	44.0%
9-30-52	6,198	2,109	34.0%
10-31-52	6,126	1,279	20.8%
11-30-52	6,129	1,703	27.8%
12-31-52	6,228	1,691	27.2%
1-31-53	6,080	1,554	25.6%
2-28-53	6,103	1,515	24.8%
3-31-53	5,936	1,542	26.0%
4-30-53	5,864	1,414	24.1%
5-31-53	4,897	1,726	29.3%
6-30-53	5,611	1,577	28.1%
7-31-53	5,146	1,353	26.4%

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Letters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
6-31-53	5,095	1,323	26.0%
9-30-53	5,030	1,219	24.1%
10-31-53	4,987	1,067	21.8%
11-30-53	5,180	1,355	26.1%
12-31-53	5,280	1,301	24.6%
1-31-54	5,562	1,444	25.8%

Letters to the Field

As noted previously, we are sending 21 letters to those offices having excessive delinquency and which have been unable to reduce it satisfactorily, instructing them to take appropriate measures to bring the investigations in the security classifications to a current status. Letters are being directed to the offices indicated by asterisks on pages four and six herein. It will be noted that the security delinquency of those offices for the month of January, 1954, appears in the extreme right hand column of the two lists on pages four and six.

Of the 21 offices above, we would like to call your attention, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Atlanta, New York and Miami to submit explanations as to their delinquent status, as noted in detail in the attached letters to those seven offices.

SAC, Philadelphia

February 15, 1954

Director, FBI

37-89

RECORDED-97-

**DEFINITION OF SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS**

*Schouten's Index - Bella* is followed  
B. B. D. D. S. is added to previous Bureau

Communications in this matter including mine of January 14, 1934. As you are aware, the Bureau has followed closely your efforts in recent months to reduce your delinquency in the security classifications of 10, 11 & 12. Your delinquency in the security field was rampant 74 per cent as of July, 1933, 43 per cent as of October, 1933. During the same period your delinquency in cases other than the security classifications, was corrected at 23 per cent in July, 1933, 1 per cent in August, 11 per cent in September, 12 per cent in October, 21 per cent in November and only 10 per cent as of December 31, 1933. The Bureau has written you to you the difficulty in your failure to maintain a security classification in your work and has repeatedly emphasized that your security work and investigations must be given the same attention and maintained in the same manner as the other cases handled by your office.

The following table shows the number of patients for whom hospitalization was required during January 1934, broken down by the age groups:

You are instructed to file by 10:00 A.M. on May 2, 1954, an application, or finding, on Form M-1000-2, for a patent on the invention described in the attached drawings, which have been filed herewith, and which is entitled "A portable airport trailer." I am sure it will be found practicable to state precisely all the features of the invention which are claimed in the drawings, and which are not claimed in the other inventions covered by the joint patent.

WCO:bb

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: / SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS  
ENTERING THE ARMED SERVICESDATE: February 5,  
1954

The attached memorandum from to the Director of 2-3-54 sets out our policy relating to cases involving Security Index subjects who become members of the Armed Services. It is stated therein that as a general policy we do not furnish to the Attorney General the names of our Security Index subjects who become members of the Armed Services inasmuch as we have no investigative responsibility regarding members of the military service.

The Director has noted on the attached memorandum: "I think we should send Attorney General the names of such persons and at same time point out the responsibilities. H."

We have initiated this practice in line with the Director's instructions and will henceforth advise the Attorney General in each such instance. We are also reviewing the files on those individuals now in the Armed Forces who were in the time of their induction carried in our Security Index. Since the field checks these cases only twice a year on a staggered basis to determine if these persons remain in the military service, it appears necessary to take immediate steps to verify their military status prior to submitting their names to the Attorney General.

ACTION:

(1) Upon completion of the review of the case files of the former Security Index subjects now in military service, we will furnish their names to the Identification Division for immediate checks at the appropriate military services.

(2) Since there is in some cases a lag between the actual discharge and the recording of same in military records at Washington, we will instruct the field offices concerned to take immediate steps to verify locally the continued military service of such subjects.

(3) As soon as the verifications have been made,  
the names of the former Security Index subjects who are still  
in the Armed Services will be forwarded to the Attorney General.  
The Attorney General will also be advised that the Armed Services  
have complete responsibility for any individual as long as he is  
connected with the service.

Paguer  
H.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

1617

DATE: Feb. 3, 1954

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM :

SUBJECT: POLICY RELATING TO CASES INVOLVING SECURITY INDEX  
SUBJECTS WHO BECOME MEMBERS OF THE ARMED SERVICES  
Internal Security - C

asked to be advised regarding the handling of Security Index cases when the subject becomes a member of the armed forces.

Whenever the subject of a security case whose name is included on our Security Index becomes a member of the armed forces, his name is immediately deleted from our Security Index. The appropriate military branch is advised and is furnished with copies of our reports concerning the subject. We also request to be advised when the subject is separated from the service. A tickler is then set by the field office and each six months a check is made to determine whether the subject has been released from the armed forces. When the subject is discharged from the military service, we immediately reopen our case and again consider whether his name should again be included in our Security Index.

Under the Delimitations Agreement as long as the subject is a member of the armed services they have full responsibility for his activities and for taking any necessary action against him. Members of the military are not subject to the provisions of the Security of Government Employees Program and we do not make loyalty investigations regarding these people.

In this connection the Director asked "Have we furnished A. G. names of all persons in the Armed Services which are in our Security Index?" As a general policy inasmuch as we have no responsibility regarding members of the military service, we do not furnish to the Attorney General the names of our Security Index subjects who become members of the armed forces. The exception is whenever the Department has specifically approved the inclusion of the name of an individual in our Security Index: we then advise the Department when his name is deleted therefrom. It is not believed the Attorney General would be interested in receiving the names of our Security Index subjects who become members of the armed forces inasmuch as at that point we have no responsibility for their activities either under our Security Index Program or under the Security of Government Employees Program.

I think we should send A. G. the names of such persons & add same to the R and the Enc!

1619

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: February 12,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index and of the total number approved by the Department to date.

The following is a report on the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on January 8, 1954.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
January 9-15	119	14	105
January 16-22	81	21	60
January 23-29	119	13	101
January 30-February 5	121	14	107
February 6-12	100	26	74
Total	540	93	447

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 369 cards were added and 68 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 301 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,515.

There is no change in the number of cards that have been specifically approved by the Department, the number being 3,335. No names have been disapproved.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

(M) SECURITY INT - GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION -- Under existing Bureau instructions Security Index cards are required to be maintained in an up-to-date status. This necessitates submission of FD-122 when it is determined that a subject has left his former employment or residence, or both, even though his current residence or employment is not yet ascertained, as pointed out in SAC Letter 53-68 (J).

Since the filing of Security Index cards in the Geographical Section is governed by residence address, those cards reflecting residence as "unknown" have presented filing problems which have been resolved by various procedures within the discretion of each office.

To insure uniformity throughout the field in such instances, you are authorized to establish a breakdown to be designated "Verification Pending" in which to file the Security Index cards of (1) subjects whose addresses are listed as "unknown" but leads outstanding are expected to result in the prompt location of those persons within the division and (2) subjects whose whereabouts in another division is actually in the process of verification, the cards bearing the address in the interim as "unknown."

1/5/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-1

In the event the Detention Program is initiated, the cases falling in both categories (1) and (2) above should be given immediate and intensive investigation to locate those subjects by coverage of leads outstanding. The cards in the first category, where verification is pending within the same division, should be utilized immediately to either apprehend those subjects at their places of employment, if known, or serve as a flag to refer to the case files where the available leads will be reflected. In the cases in category (2), above, the immediate review of those Security Index cards will dictate the utilization of the case files to follow leads in the other division to effect those subjects' prompt apprehension.

You are reminded that according to the Manual of Instructions Form FD-128 may not be submitted until the presence of a subject in another division has actually been verified by that division. During the interim that such verification is pending, the cards will have been amended to reflect both address and employment as "unknown."

It is recognized that the above procedure may not be found necessary in those offices having relatively few Security Index subjects and for that reason the breakdown should be utilized only in the event an office has situations falling within the two categories, above.

The Security Index cards to be included in the "Verification Pending" breakdown of the Geographical Section will, of course, be those in the process of routine changes of address. This distinguishes them completely from the categories which qualify for inclusion in the Unavailable Section. This distinction should be pointed out specifically to your Agents.

1620

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 19,  
1954

FROM : *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - C-1

During the past week, 44 new cards were added to  
the Security Index and 13 cards were cancelled, a net  
increase of 31 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,546.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

UNRECORDED  
2-25-54

S E C R E T

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 25, 1954

Director, FBI

EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM  
FBI File

Reference is made to previous memoranda regarding individuals considered potentially dangerous to the national security presently employed in the Federal Government.

Please be advised that \_\_\_\_\_, who is included in the Security Index, has recently been employed by the United States Naval Ordnance Plant, Indianapolis, Indiana.

is presently the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order 10450, the results of which will be disseminated promptly upon completion to the Civil Service Commission and the Department in accordance with existing procedures.

Investigative reports on \_\_\_\_\_, bearing the character \_\_\_\_\_ have been forwarded previously to the Records Administration Branch of the Department.

1621

GENEALOGICAL FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: Feb. 9, 1954

FROM :

SUBJECT:

*berle*

In accordance with the Director's desires, the one hundred cases specified in the attached list have been reviewed either by me or in my office to determine if the Bureau is in any way vulnerable in having these individuals on the Security Index. In all cases, except one, there are sound grounds for the inclusion of the individual on the Security Index.

I think this is a borderline case and inclusion of this individual on the list would not embarrass the Bureau.

| There are several cases in which, in my opinion, a report should  
| be submitted at the earliest possible date consistent with the more urgent  
security matters. These cases are as follows:

UNRECORDED

2-17-54

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 17,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: REVISIONS -  
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS  
AND FBI HANDBOOK

Attached memorandum from [redacted] to the Director dated February 10, 1954, notes that the Director has approved the dissemination of an SAC Letter instructing the field that prior Bureau approval must be obtained before the preparation of prosecutive summary reports. Such instructions necessitate certain changes in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Section 4, page 12, and in the FBI Handbook, Part I, page 40.

ACTION:

There are attached hereto the required changes in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the FBI Handbook, as noted above.

UNRECORDED  
2-17-54

February 17, 1954

PROPOSED CHANGE IN  
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Section 4, Page 12

Under "d. Summary Reports," left-hand column dealing with Prosecutive Summary reports, delete that portion of item (2) which states "Only in major and complicated cases and upon specific instructions of SAC or Bureau." Insert therefor "Only with specific Bureau approval or upon Burecu instructions in major and complicated cases."

PROPOSED CHANGE IN  
FBI HANDBOOK

Part I, Page 40

At top of page, left-hand column, dealing with Prosecutive Summary reports, delete that portion of item 56, B, which reads: "Only in major and complicated cases and upon specific instructions of SAC or Bureau." Insert therefor the following: "Only with specific Bureau approval or upon Bureau instructions, in major and complicated cases."

ENCLOSURE /

1622

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 18,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - *Gen'l*  
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS

## DETAILS:

Attached is a memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted] of 2-9-54 which notes that [redacted] has completed the review of Security Index cases. It is stated that of the [redacted], one case, involving [redacted], may be considered debatable, although as a borderline case the inclusion of [redacted] in the Security Index would not embarrass the Bureau. Activities are summarized in the attached, reflecting: (1) Contributions for defense of Communist Party national leaders convicted in 1949. (2) Daily Worker subscriber 1947, 1949 and 1950. (3) Allegation of CP membership in 1948 based on observations of reliable informant. (4) Interviewed with negative results in October, 1953. It was also noted that [redacted] is employed as a railroad fireman.

Since this case was reviewed by [redacted], the Pittsburgh Office, origin in the [redacted] case has submitted a summary report setting out the following additional data regarding [redacted]: (1) In 1951, 1952 and 1953 he paid a total of \$36.00 for subscriptions to the "Daily Worker" and "Worker." (2) He visited CP headquarters in Pittsburgh on [redacted] to donate \$2.00 to the "Daily Worker" Fund. (3) Attempted to recruit for the CP and disseminated copies of "Daily Worker" on railroad property in 1948 and 1949. (4) Attended CP rally in 1949.

It would appear that [redacted] inclusion in the Security Index is amply justified with the receipt of the more recent data, above.

The attached memorandum suggests on page 2 that up-to-date reports should be submitted on nine specified cases. A review of these cases indicates that they are a part of the backlog of cases scheduled for summary reports by the Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York Offices. The deadline for these reports is 7-14-54, except New York, and these offices have assured the Bureau that the deadline will be met. As you know,

New York is exempted from the summary report program at present, but we are following them closely with regard to resumption as soon as circumstances permit.

In the absence of any unusual considerations, it does not appear that these nine cases should be distinguished from the other Security Index cases of the same type scheduled for reports, and it does not appear that the above offices should be asked to give them preferred attention.

RECOMMENDED:

That no action be taken at this time with regard to the nine cases mentioned by . If you approve, we will follow the submission of reports in these cases along with others of the same type scheduled by the offices concerned.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: February 10  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUMMARY REPORTS

SYNOPSIS: Security Index - 2/1

Attached Executives' Conference memorandum dealing with summary reports, dated 2-3-54, on page five states: "The yearly supplemental summary reports (in Security Index cases) do not increase the work in the field as the field would have to submit investigative reports which would contain the same information." You asked "Isn't this a duplication then? H." No duplication involved since the supplemental summary, in setting out only the unreported information, is actually in lieu of investigative report. On page six of attached memorandum, also dealing with Security Index summary reports, you inquired "What about the New York situation? H." New York did not resume preparation of these reports because of heavy backlog in pending security cases. In conjunction with inspection of New York Office, memorandum, to [redacted] dated 12-12-53, estimated 65 additional agents required to bring New York to current status in summary report project in one year, recommended against such allocation in view of more pressing demands in other phases of security work. New York exhibited unusual progress in reducing delinquency and backlog in security work during 1953. Continuation in this direction being followed in order that resumption of summary report project may be considered as soon as circumstances permit. On page two of attached memorandum, referring to prosecutive summary reports, [redacted] has noted "Continue but require Sect of Government approval before preparation of any prosecutive summaries." Instruction embodied in SAC Letter attached for approval. Manual and Handbook changes are being prepared.

RECOMMENDATION:

Subject to your approval there is attached a proposed SAC Letter instructing the field that prior Bureau approval must be obtained before the preparation of prosecutive summary reports.

DETAILS:

Attached is Executives' Conference memorandum of February 3, 1954, dealing with summary reports under the following categories: Prosecutive Summary Reports, Investigative Summary Reports and Security Index Summary Reports.

On page five, last paragraph, it is stated "The yearly supplemental summary reports (in Security Index cases) do not increase the work in the field as the field would have to submit investigative reports which would contain the same information." You noted: "Isn't this a duplication then? H." In response to your inquiry, this procedure does not entail any duplication in reporting. The supplemental summary report brings the file up-to-date incorporating the unreported material in the file. It is prepared in accordance with the general instructions we have issued regarding summary reports and is submitted in lieu of an investigative report which is not required.

On page six, also dealing with the Security Index summary reports, you asked "What about the New York situation? H." As you know, New York was exempted from resumption of this

program because of their heavy backlog of pending security cases. These cases require preferred attention, of course, since they must be investigated to determine if Security Index cards are warranted. During the recent inspection of the New York Office it was reported in a memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted] dated December 12, 1953, that 65 additional Agents would be required for one year to bring the summary report program to a current status in that office. The utilization of an additional 65 Agents for such purpose was not recommended, however, since they could more profitably be used in other phases of security work considered more pressing at this time.

It should be noted that New York does submit summary reports (1) when they are the initial reports in cases in which the subject is being included in the Security Index; (2) when the subject moves to another field office territory and (3) when the Bureau specifically requests them. By letter of February 1, 1954, New York advised that under this program they have submitted 1,699 of 5,496 summary reports scheduled, approximately 31%.

As you know, the New York Office has made unusually good progress in reducing their security delinquency during the past year, from 76% in January, 1953 to 43% as of December 31, 1953. They have also been able to reduce their pending backlog in security cases from 7,288 to 5,115 during the same period.

We are following New York closely on the matter of further reducing their security delinquency and will at the same time give consideration to resumption of the summary report program at the first opportunity when circumstances permit.

---

With regard to prosecutive summary reports, on page two of the attached memorandum [redacted] has noted: "Continue but require Seat of Government approval before preparation of any prosecutive summaries." This instruction is embodied in the proposed SAC Letter attached hereto for approval. Manual and Handbook changes are being prepared.

(7)

Security Index Summary ReportsThe present policy:

A program to prepare summary reports in all Security Index cases was instituted by SAC Letter No. 95, Series 1951, dated September 22, 1951. After preparation of the initial summary report, an auxiliary summary report is required each year. As of January 1, 1954, 30 field offices have completed the initial summary reports in these cases. Because of the condition of security work in New York, that office was given a moratorium on the project. New York does submit summary reports on new cases and, therefore, has submitted 1,769 reports out of a total of 5,838 names on their Security Index.

In the remaining 21 field offices the program will be completed by July 14, 1954, calling for a total of 4,702 summary reports left to be completed as of now. Of this number Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia and Chicago reported a total of 3,268 summary reports to be prepared.

A check of these 4 offices shows that while the summary reports are distributed over large groups of Agents, the estimated Agent days per week spent on summary reports reflect the following number of Agents being utilized on this project in terms of Agent days - Los Angeles, 99; San Francisco, 25; Chicago, 34; Philadelphia, 21 - for a total of 179. These offices have approximately three-fourths of the remaining summary reports to be completed. Therefore, applying this ratio to the 179 agents, approximately 240 agents are being utilized in all offices at the present time to complete this project by July 14, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

It should be remembered that Los Angeles fell behind on this program and for that reason has had to put a large amount of manpower on the program to complete it by July 14. The remaining offices do not have a heavy amount of manpower on the program.

Discontinuance of the program will not release 240 agents because the agents would still be required to submit investigative reports in many of these cases instead of the summary reports they are now preparing. Discontinuance of the program would save the time required to go back through the files to bring together and document information secured through previous investigation and reported by investigative report.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

Messrs. [redacted] recommended that we continue this summary report program for the following reasons:

(1) As the Department is not reviewing for approval our security reports, the Bureau is taking the responsibility for those persons included on the Security Index. This requires that we must be sure that the cases are sound on Security Index subjects.

(2) Many of the investigative reports submitted up to 1951 were not documented to show the actual source of the information developed against the subjects. The summary report program requires complete documentation so that we can back up the information we have. Since 1951 we have required documentation not only in summary reports but in investigative reports. If we discontinue our summary report program, we will not be able to back up properly information contained in investigative reports prior to 1951.

(3) It took a tremendous amount of supervision and pressure on the field to get this program implemented. The field has accepted it and it is nearly completed. If we discontinue it or declare a moratorium, we will again have to overcome the inertia of the field to get the program completed.

(4) The yearly supplemental summary reports do not increase the work in the field as the field would have to submit investigative reports which would contain the same information.

Isn't this a duplication  
then? -5-

1624

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

(5) The preparation of summary reports requires detailed review of each case and reevaluation of the case. It is imperative that we continue at periodic intervals to reevaluate every case on the Security Index in view of our responsibility. The summary report requires the field to reevaluate the case and furnishes the basis for reevaluation at the Seat of Government. With our limited number of Supervisors at the Seat of Government, we could not otherwise reevaluate these cases.

(6) By July 14, 1954, this program will have been completed and manpower will be available for other pressing assignments.

recommended the discontinuance of this summary report program on the basis that he felt that investigative reports are sufficient and the summary reports are not necessary. also, so the agents can be assigned to more productive work recommended that a moratorium be declared on the remaining part of the summary report program until January 1, 1955, at which time it would be resumed.

\* \* \* \* \*

We will be guided by the majority recommendations of the Executives' Conference unless you advise to the contrary.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

If it can be completed  
by July 14, 1954 I will  
allow it to be continued.  
What about N.Y. situation.  
J.H.

-b-

*[Redacted]* 1625  
Assistant Attorney  
Criminal Division

February 24, 1954

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of the individuals maintained in the Security Index. Names included in the main portion of the list are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals coming within five designated groups are listed on separate pages. Following each name is information reflecting the race, sex, birth date, Bureau file number and the Bureau field office covering the residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment

NOTE ON YELLOW ONLY:

Espionage Section of the Special Section not included.

The five designated groups are:

Foreign Government Employees  
United Nations Employees  
Pro-Tito Yugoslavia  
U. S. Government Employees  
Atomic Energy Program Employees

RECORDED-53

MAR 1 1954

130

EX-103 — — — 02 DEB 02 102100

1625 1625 FEB 1 1954

REC'D-101-CM.POLICE

**UNRECORDED**

Deputy Attorney General

February 24, 1954

Director, FBI

**EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM**  
**FBI File**

Security Index - General

This is to advise you that upon the induction into the Armed Services of subjects listed in our Security Index, we delete their names therefrom, since under the Limitations Agreement the military services at that point assume complete responsibility for such individuals. We advise the appropriate branch of the Armed Services of the background and subversive activities of each such subject by furnishing them copies of investigative reports.

According to our records, there are 56 individuals now serving in the Armed Forces who at the time of their entry into military service were designated for detention by this Bureau in the event of national emergency.

I thought you would like to know the identities of these persons and for that reason I am attaching hereto a list containing their names, broken down according to the military component with which they are connected. Their dates of entry into the services are indicated under the respective names and on the right are noted their current assignments as developed by a recent check of appropriate military records at Washington, D. C., and in the field.

It may be observed that United States Army, and , United States Navy, have been in military service over an extended period. enlisted in 1942 and has remained in the service continuously since that time. He was removed from the list of persons designated for apprehension under the then-existing Custodial Detention Program, because of his entry into military service. enlisted in the United States Navy on August 28, 1942,

UNRECORDED

2-24-54

[Redacted]  
and has served in that branch without interruption to date. A Custodial Detention card maintained on [Redacted] was cancelled upon his entry into the service at that time.

Copies of reports in these cases have been forwarded previously to the Records Administration Branch of the Department.

We will continue to advise you on a current basis of the Security index subjects entering military service.

1626

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS  
ENTERING THE ARMED SERVICES.

DATE: February 9,  
1954

✓

My memorandum of 2-5-54 noted that in compliance with the Director's instructions we have initiated the practice of advising the Attorney General when a Security Index subject enters the Armed Forces. Further, it was stated that files of former Security Index subjects already in military service were being reviewed and upon completion, the continued military status of such persons would be verified by (1) inquiry at the appropriate service by the Identification Division and (2) the field offices origin in such cases, in view of the possible lag in recording discharges on records in Washington.

The 61 case files of such subjects have been reviewed and the individual names are set out on the attachment hereto for referral to the Identification Division. The field is being requested to verify locally the military status of these subjects, where possible. In some instances the files reflected that because of the length of service of the subjects, no local sources are cognizant of their present service connections.

Upon completion of the above checks, the Attorney General will be promptly advised of the identities of the subjects concerned, pointing out that the Armed Services have complete responsibility for these persons during their military service.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That this memorandum, with attached list of names be referred to the Identification Division for immediate verification of the continued military status of these former Security Index subjects.

(2) That the attached airtels and airgram be transmitted to the field for local verification of military service, where possible, in the cases specified.

UNRECORDED  
2-9-54

(N) KEY FACILITIES - PLANT INFORMANTS -- Your attention is directed to paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12 dated February 3, 1953, and SAC Letter 53-51 dated July 21, 1953, with which all continental offices were furnished appropriate state sections of the sixth edition of the Department of Defense Master Geographical Key Facilities List designated as KFL (F). You were advised at that time that the Department of Defense would from time to time issue corrected pages to reflect any additions, deletions or other changes.

Due to the many changes, the Department of Defense has prepared a seventh edition of the Key Facilities List which is dated December 31, 1953, and referred to as KFL (G). You will note that each line in which a change has occurred has been appropriately marked. However, many of the changes recorded in the new KFL (G) will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

The bottom of each page of this new edition of the Key Facilities List is marked "Original." You will note a column on the extreme right of each page headed "CH. NO." The appearance of the letter "G" in this column represents a change in the line opposite that letter. For example, if the address of a facility was previously listed incorrectly and is now being corrected and no other changes with respect to that facility have been made, the symbol will appear only opposite the line affecting the address of the facility. If a new facility has been added, the letter "G" will appear opposite each line pertaining to the facility, such as the name, address and products involved. In such latter case the letter "G" may appear three or more times with respect to the one facility.

If a facility has been deleted, the geographical reference number will appear in the KFL (G) with the word "Deleted" followed by the letter "G." In such cases it will be necessary to refer to the KFL (F) now in your possession to determine the name of that facility. In such instances a notation should be made in your file covering this facility that the facility involved was deleted from the Key Facilities List by KFL (G.)

It will also be noted that in a few instances the geographical reference number has been changed. This has occurred in those instances in which the facility was originally listed in one city or town and later determined to be located in another city or town. Due to its change in locality and its subsequent change of position in the Key Facilities List, the Department of Defense has assigned a different geographical reference number.

2/9/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-8

UNRECORDED

2-9-54

All such changes are appropriately marked in the KFL (G). Any changes in the enclosed KFL (G) which will affect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in key facilities must be carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected forms FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph N of SAC Letter Number 53-12.

Each office with the exception of the Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan Offices is being furnished appropriate state sections and forewords of the KFL (G) with this SAC Letter. Those offices covering only portions of a state will receive complete state sections. KFL (F) furnished you with SAC Letter Number 53-51 dated July 21, 1953, should be destroyed when it is no longer needed to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Programs.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED S GOVERNMENT

1627

TO : Mr. [REDACTED]

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS  
ENTERING THE ARMED SERVICES

DATE: February 17, 1954

Security Index - Gen

Reference is made to Mr. [REDACTED]  
memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED] dated February 9, 1954.There is attached a list setting forth the latest  
available information from the files of the armed services  
and the Veterans Administration.

Attachment

134 memo for AFB 2-23-54 [REDACTED]  
134 memo for Regt. Dep't [REDACTED] 2-23-54 [REDACTED]

Briggs

-1627

RECORDED-34

INDEXED-34

MAR 21 1954

53 MAR 8 1954 EX-127

Sob

*AMERICAN*

February 23, 1964

SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS  
EXTENDING THE ARMED FORCES  
Bufile

DETAILS

The Director has instructed that we advise the Department of the identities of former Security Index subjects now serving in the Armed Forces and point out the fact that the military services have complete responsibility for such personnel.

In memorandum of February 4, 1964, noted that the Identification Division was checking the present status of these subjects and, in view of the lag in the recording of discharges in military records in Washington, D.C., the field was also making appropriate inquiries.

These checks have now been completed and it has been verified that 34 former Security Index subjects are now serving with the Armed Services.

RECOMMENDATION:

Subject to your approval, there is a letter to the Department, inviting the 34 former Security Index subjects now in military service, advising them of the responsibility of the Armed Forces for these subjects and noting that we will never forget the placement in individual cases of the entry into the military service of Security Index subjects.

1628

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem

um • UNITED S

OVERNMENT

DATE: February 26,

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - Card

During the past week, 71 new cards were added to the Security Index and 17 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 54 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,600.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

1629

STANDARD FORM NO. 64  
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 24,  
1954

X FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX-- PREPARATION OF  
SUMMARY REPORTS  
Bufile

SUGGESTION #93-54

DETAILS:

Attached is a suggestion originating with the Philadelphia Office regarding the documentation on administrative pages of investigative summary reports in security cases.

has solicited the comments of the Internal Security Section.

Under existing instructions, when the office preparing such a report does not possess the documentary data regarding specific items in the report, that office proceeds to submit the report but notes on the administrative pages at the appropriate places "Awaiting Documentation." Upon the receipt of the data from the other offices, the office preparing the report submits amended, complete administrative pages. As you know, the "documentation" referred to above is the data we require on the administrative pages in the Security Index summary reports setting out the history and exact location in field office files of the information in the reports in order that the original material may be found expeditiously in the event of a national emergency.

The attached suggestion would allow the office submitting the report to simply leave blank spaces when the documentation is not available. Thereafter, upon receipt of the required data, the submitting office would by letter furnish the data to the offices receiving the report. The latter offices would then insert the documentary data by typing, or if minor amendments, by hand printing in ink.

The Philadelphia field supervisor advises against the adoption of this suggestion as noted on page 2 of the attached, pointing out that additions would be too numerous

and present more chance of error by having multiple offices making extensive additions. This observation appears to be entirely correct. Every office receiving the report, as well as the Bureau, would be required to disassemble and type on the administrative pages, the specific entries upon their receipt by letter from the office submitting the report. It appears inescapable that errors would result from this procedure, rather than having the submitting office prepare the amended pages as required under present instructions. Further, no office could be aware of any such errors made by the other offices receiving the report.

It should be noted that space difficulties would be presented; i.e., the documentary data as developed, might well require more space than that allocated by the office preparing the report. This would entail preparation of amended pages, the very practice the attached suggestion seeks to avoid.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to advise that the Internal Security Section does not favor the adoption of the attached suggestion.

UNRECORDED  
2-25-54

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 25, 1954

Director, FBI

EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM  
FBI File

Reference is made to previous memoranda regarding individuals considered potentially dangerous to the national security presently employed in the Federal Government.

is presently the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order 10450, the results of which will be disseminated promptly upon completion to the Civil Service Commission and the Department in accordance with existing procedures.

Investigative reports on , bearing the character have been forwarded previously to the Records Administration Branch of the Department.

UNRECORDED

March 3, 1954

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Director, FBI

NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - S  
FBI File

This is to advise you of the reported current membership of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) and pertinent statistics relating to those members who are included in the Security Index. L-1+

Since the October, 1950, uprising in Puerto Rico, no information has been received which would indicate that the NPPR has issued membership cards or has maintained membership lists. As of October 31, 1953, however, it was determined by collation of information received from several reliable sources that there were approximately 405 NPPR adherents residing in Puerto Rico. The 113 NPPR membership residing in the United States has been reported from reliable sources as 113. The total membership, therefore, is reported as 518.

Of the 405 adherents in Puerto Rico, 267 have been placed in the Security Index and are subject to apprehension in the event of a national emergency. All 113 NPPR members in the United States are included in the Security Index and additional names are added as their NPPR membership or adherence is developed.

There is set out hereinafter a tabulation of NPPR Security Index subjects by field offices:

San Juan	267
New York	81
Chicago	20
Newark	7
New Haven	1
Washington Field	2
Philadelphia	2
Atlanta	1
Total	380

UNRECORDED

3-3-54

The foregoing is being furnished for your information in light of the outbreak of violence by members of captioned organization in the House of Representatives on March 1, 1954.

1630

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 5, 1954

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week, 110 new cards were added to the Security Index and 11 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 99 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,699.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

UNRECORDED

SAC, Baltimore

March 10, 1954

Director, FBI

EIJIAH MOHAMMED, was;  
Muslim Cult of Islam, etc  
SOLICITATIVE SERVICE ACT - 1940;  
CONSPIRACY;  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Security Index-General

Bulletin of February 15, 1954, advising of the practice in your office in regard to the opening of a security case on individuals affiliated with Muslim Cult of Islam.

Item (3) in SAC Letter 53-28 dated March 17, 1953, advised you "When it is known or becomes known that this Cult is active in your territory, you should immediately institute a security-type investigation on all individuals who are reported to us (1) functionaries or leaders of the Cult, (2) members of the Military Section of the Cult known as the "Fruit of Islam" or (3) active participants in carrying out fanatical and disloyal aims and purposes of the Cult. At this time it is not desired that investigations be initiated based on mere membership alone."

In relet you state that officers and active participants in the Cult are investigated "at such time as sufficient identifying data is obtained upon which to predicate the investigation." You inquired whether such procedure is acceptable.

Because of the secretive nature of this organization, the Bureau fully realizes the difficulty encountered in identifying members of this Cult. As pointed out in the above SAC Letter, a thorough investigation of the group cannot be pursued effectively without substantial informant coverage. Only by active investigation and the development of informants can we hope to penetrate the organization and identify its members.

The Bureau does not agree with your practice of handling matters as set out in example regarding " .," reportedly a captain of Muslim cleric training at , the fact that such a person

**UNRECORDED**

3-10-54

is in existence and is a position of leadership requires that investigation be initiated promptly to identify her and determine the nature and scope of her activities. As you may perceive, your practice of waiting until identifying information is received without any investigative effort by your office does not insure her identification and is wholly undesirable. You should immediately open a security investigation of " " in line with the above comments.

The foregoing is for your guidance and compliance and should be discussed with Agents in your office handling these investigations.

Copies of this letter are being designated for the Chicago Office along with a copy of referenced Baltimore letter which was inadvertently directed to the Bureau.

March 16, 1954

Deputy Attorney General

Director, FBI

EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM  
FBI File

Reference is made to previous memoranda addressed to the Attorney General regarding individuals considered potentially dangerous in the employ of the United States Government.

Please be advised that whose name appeared on the lists set out in my memoranda of September 16, 1953, and January 7, 1954, has been separated from his employment with the United States Post Office Department, Los Angeles, California. His status as a Security Index subject remains unchanged.

You are further advised that , an employee of the Veterans Administration, in Los Angeles, California, has been designated for inclusion in the Security Index as a person potentially dangerous to the national security. , who was born , at New York City, has been ~~located~~ investigated under the provisions of Executive Orders 9835 and 10450, the latter becoming effective during the course of such investigation. Copies of reports were transmitted to the Department by our memorandum of March 4, 1953, to Assistant Attorney General , containing

, also known as Appointee; Veterans Administration, Los Angeles, California, "loyalty of Government employees." Supplementary data were transmitted with our memorandum of June 14, 1953, and February 22, 1954, also addressed to , bearing the character "loyalty of Government employees."

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/23/54

FROM :

(JK)

SUBJECT: STANDARDS FOR OPENING SECURITY MATTER  
INVESTIGATIONS ON INDIVIDUALS

## Security Index

SYNOPSIS:

The following questions have been raised by concerning Security Matter investigations on individuals:

- (1) Are our criteria sufficiently elastic for opening new Security Matter investigations.
- (2) Are there enough grounds to open an investigation under present standards.

In connection with the opening of Security Matter investigations the Manual of Instructions states that it is not possible to formulate hard and fast standards to measure the dangerousness of individuals and sound judgment and discretion must be applied in opening these cases. The Manual states that cases should be opened on individuals who fall within any of the following categories: membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1/1/49; espousing the line of revolutionary movements; special training in a revolutionary movement such as training in the Lenin School, training in a subversive movement abroad, leadership training in one of the basic revolutionary organizations; individuals who have served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade; individuals who are alleged to have been a member of one of the basic revolutionary groups at any time and have served in the military forces of any country; individuals employed in key facilities who are alleged to have been a member of a basic revolutionary organization or against whom subversive information is known; and individuals with revolutionary beliefs.

The Manual also states that the above is not an all-inclusive standard, sound judgment and discretion must be used, and where there is a doubt that an individual may be a threat to internal security the question should be resolved in the interest of security. The standards for opening cases appears to be sufficiently elastic.

A Hatch Act investigation was conducted on Telford Taylor in 1942 as he was reported to be on the active indicative of the American Peace Mobilization. He denied membership in that organization but admitted membership in the National Lawyers Guild. He served in the U. S. Army from 1942 - 1943 and was released from active duty as a brigadier general. For a time during 1942 he was Small Defense Plants Administrator. He is reportedly practicing law in New York. Taylor has voiced criticism of Senator McCarthy and Senator McCarthy has been critical of Taylor.

*Answer*  
Early in 1953 the Internal Security Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division reviewed the file and file references on Taylor to determine whether an investigation should be conducted. On 12/11/53, while this file review process was underway, the New York Office submitted a teletype summary of pertinent data in its file on Taylor. The Internal Security Section decided to request Washington Field Office and New York to contact reliable informants, review office files, and for New York to submit a summary on Taylor rather than conduct a full investigation because Taylor was a controversial public figure, a brigadier general in the Army Reserves, a possibility he might be subpoenaed by the McCarthy Committee, and G-2 had previously investigated him. The letter requesting such an investigation had been dictated, but before it was transcribed, G-2 on 12/24/53 requested the Bureau to conduct a full investigation. This request was not carried out because of the reasons set forth above, and on 1/8/54 Washington Field and New York were directed to review files, contact informants, and for New York to submit a summary report. This report was submitted 1/22/54, which reflected that Taylor was a member of the National Lawyers Guild from 1935 - 1942; Carnegie Institute for International Peace, 1949 - 1951; member of American Veterans Committee in 1952; and was reported to have been in contact with and or associated either with members of, or individuals closely affiliated with, the Communist Party. Some of these individuals he had recommended for jobs, others the relationship appeared to be that of Attorney-Client. Domestic Intelligence Division does not believe that any further investigation would be desirable because of the reasons set forth and because sufficient information has been developed to evaluate Taylor from a security standpoint. *Not on Security merits*.

Domestic Intelligence Division states that if the same facts were available on a noncontroversial figure as were available on Taylor, an investigation would be conducted. It appears that there was sufficient grounds to open an investigation on Taylor but the limited type of investigation was desirable.

*(It wouldn't make any difference whether the person is controversial or non-controversial)  $\rightarrow$  Jack*

Recommendations:

(1) That the field again be advised that standards listed for opening investigations are not all inclusive, and that where there is doubt that an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, investigation should be conducted. Domestic Intelligence Division agrees with the recommendation.

*Wes H.*

(2) It is recommended that the field again be advised that where there is an accumulation of unresolved information of a possible subversive nature in the field office files on an individual, such as unexplained association with Communist Party members, this information should be carefully evaluated to determine whether an investigation is warranted. Domestic Intelligence Division agrees.

*Wes H.*

(3) It is recommended that a letter be sent to the SAC at New York pointing out that the information available to New York on prior to 1/6/54 was sufficient to open and conduct an investigation.

*Wes H.*

DETAILS:

In connection with a memorandum dated 2/2/54 from [redacted] to [redacted] concerning [redacted], the following questions were raised by [redacted]

(1) Are our criteria sufficiently elastic for opening new Security Matter investigations.

(2) Are there enough grounds to open an investigation on Taylor under present standards.

Standards For Opening Security Investigations on Individuals

The primary purposes of Security Matter investigations of individuals are to determine if the individual is dangerous to the internal security and to determine if there have been any violations of federal statutes. If the individual is considered dangerous to the internal security he is placed on the Security Index. The standards which determine as to whether an individual should be placed on the Security Index were drawn up after consultation with the Department. Our standards for opening Security Matter investigations have a direct relationship with the standards for placing an individual on the Security Index.

Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions contains instructions as to when cases are to be opened and investigations conducted. That section of the Manual states that it is not possible to formulate any hard and fast standards by which the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates may be automatically measured, and that sound judgment and discretion must be applied in evaluating the importance and dangerousness of individuals. The Manual then states that as a matter of general policy, security cases should be opened and investigation conducted of any individual falling within one or more of the following categories:

(a) Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1/1/49.

(b) Espousing line of revolutionary movements.

(c) Special training in a revolutionary movement.

(1) Any individual who has received training in the Lenin School or training in a subversive movement abroad.

(2) Any individual who has received, at any time, leadership training in one of the basic revolutionary organizations.

(d) Military Service

(1) Any individual who has served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.

(2) Any individual who has been alleged to have been a member of one of the basic revolutionary groups at any time and has served in the Office of Strategic Services or in the military forces of any country.

(e) Employment in key facilities if the individual is alleged to have been at any time a member of any of the basic revolutionary organizations or against whom sufficient subversive information is known which warrants investigation.

(f) Individuals with revolutionary beliefs.

Following the enumeration set forth above, the Manual contains the following statements:

It is not intended that the above be interpreted as an all inclusive standard for instituting investigations of individuals. Because of the wide range and variety of subversive activity in which an individual may engage, it is imperative that you exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating the importance and dangerousness of individual members and affiliates of the basic revolutionary and front organizations. There are many factors and possibilities which it is necessary to consider in determining whether investigation should be instituted in each instance. Decision as to whether investigation should be undertaken must be based on information available in each case. Where there is doubt that an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, the question as to whether investigation should be undertaken should be resolved in the interest of security. Security type cases already existing must be constantly and carefully evaluated to determine that important individuals are being given the attention necessary in keeping with our responsibilities for the internal security.

These provisions would indicate that investigations must be opened on any individual falling within any of the specified standards for opening investigations, and that investigation should be opened on any individual in which there is a doubt as to whether he may be a current threat to the internal security. These standards are elastic and this is desirable.

for opening investigations. He stated, however, that this is a borderline case and noted that on 12/11/53 the New York Office sent a teletype to the Bureau setting forth a summary of information in its files on . The teletype did not contain any information as to whether an investigation was being conducted by New York.

The Domestic Intelligence Division agrees that the information on in the possession of the Bureau prior to 1/6/54 did not fall within any of the enumerated standards for opening cases, but it is of the opinion that the instructions issued concerning the opening of cases are sufficiently broad and elastic to warrant the opening of a case on . The responsibility for opening cases is placed on the SAC of each office; however, the Bureau does have the responsibility of instructing the field to open a case, or determine if an investigation is actually being conducted when it appears that the facts in the possession of the Bureau warrant an investigation.

Conclusions:

(1) The criteria for opening new cases are sufficiently elastic. It is suggested, however, that it be re-emphasized to the field that the standards listed for opening investigations are not all inclusive, and that where there is doubt that an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, an investigation should be conducted. It is suggested that the field again be advised that where there is an accumulation of unresolved information of a possible subversive nature on an individual, all information in office files should be evaluated to determine whether investigation is warranted.

(2) There were sufficient grounds to open an investigation on under current standards. It is believed that the limited-type investigation which was ordered was desirable because was a controversial figure at that time, and had a full investigation been conducted it could well have been embarrassing to the Bureau. The statement made in the memorandum of 1/29/54 from to that information developed on does not warrant a security investigation under Bureau standards was a poor choice of words and should have been further explained. There were sufficient

grounds, in the interest of security, to open an investigation on under current standards even though the allegations did not meet any of the specifically enumerated standards set forth in the Manual of Instructions. However, because of the prominence of [redacted] and the current publicity the facts also dictated that a limited-type investigation be conducted. This was done. It is believed that the limited-type investigation which was ordered was desirable because [redacted] is a controversial figure, and had a full investigation been conducted it could well have been embarrassing to the Bureau.

1632

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: March 9, 1954

FROM :

ADP SUBJECT: STANDARDS FOR OPENING SECURITY MATTER  
INVESTIGATIONS ON INDIVIDUALS

## Security Index - General

In accordance with the 3 approved recommendations appearing in the attached memorandum from to dated February 23, 1954, there are attached:

- 1) A proposed SAC Letter re-emphasizing instructions contained in the Manual of Instructions regarding the opening of security investigations. It points out that the categories listed for opening investigations are not all-inclusive and that where there is any doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security, an investigation should be conducted. In addition, the proposed SAC Letter re-emphasizes that where there is an accumulation of unresolved information of a possible subversive nature in the field office files on an individual, such as unexplained association with Communist Party members, this information should be carefully evaluated to determine whether an investigation is warranted.
- 2) A letter to the SAC at New York pointing out that the information available to New York on was sufficient to open and conduct a security investigation.

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 11, 1934

FROM : MR. ██████████ 2B

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION TO REVIEW SPECIAL CASES

(7)C

1633 ✓

You have inquired whether the Criminal Division and Assistant Attorney General ██████████ have been given a list of the names of special individuals concerning whom we want an opinion as to listing their names in the Security Index.

The names have been furnished to the Criminal Division and to Mr. ██████████. They include persons identified as U. S. Government Employees (19 included - 3 approved by Department); United Nations Employees (7 included - 1 approved by Department); Foreign Government Employees (39 included - 18 approved by Department) and Atomic Energy Program Employees (1 included and not approved by Department). Originally we, in addition requested the Department's opinion as to whether the names of 34 persons identified as prominent in the business and professional fields should be added to the Security Index. That number has been reduced to 32. One individual is no longer considered prominent and has been added to the Security Index and the Department advised. One individual was cooperative on interview and is not considered dangerous at this time.

The Criminal Division is fully aware of the identities of all individuals included in the above categories. Each month when an up-to-date Security Index list is furnished to the Department, the names in the 4 categories mentioned above are set out on separate sheets to the list, each sheet specifically identified. The prominent individuals are not on the Security Index list at this time but they have been specifically named in memoranda to the Department. Investigative reports have been furnished to the Department in each case. There have been no approvals received from the Department in the 4 employee categories mentioned above since the Attorney General advised us on 9-30-53 that he was discontinuing the general review of all Security Index cases. By his memorandum of 11-17-53 he stated that the Criminal Division would review and consider for the Index all individuals in the 4 categories and those considered prominent. A brief background of the developments in this matter during the last year is set out on the attachment.

ACTION: This is for your information.

Attachment 2 MAR 93  
2. Handwritten notes:  
1. Prominent names  
2. and memo is in  
last date of word division.

1633

- 3-16-53 - advised preliminary reviews of the cases of "the 34 prominent individuals specifically named" had been made but that he was withholding final determination until the Criminal Division has further experience in processing Security Index cases.
- 9-24-53 - In memorandum to we advised that each month when we send an up-to-date Security Index list to him, the U. S. Government Employees on the Security Index are specifically identified on a separate sheet and we suggested that prior consideration be given to the review of those cases. No approvals or disapprovals have been received since that date in that category.
- 10-15-53 - After receiving a letter from the Attorney General that the Criminal Division was discontinuing the review of Security Index cases, we replied by memorandum to the Attorney General and urged that the Criminal Division continue to review the U. S. Government, United Nations, Foreign Government and Atomic Energy Program employees as well as the 34 prominent persons. In that memorandum we listed by name the 34 prominent persons inasmuch as they are not included in the Security Index and we have been following the Department regarding their names since May 24, 1951. A copy of that memorandum was sent to
- 11-17-53 - The Attorney General advised that he had instructed the Criminal Division to continue the review of a limited number of special types of cases, specifically subjects in the 4 employee categories mentioned above as well as the names of the prominent individuals specifically listed in our memorandum of 10-15-53.
- 12-18-53 - At your instruction, conferred with of the Criminal Division concerning the 34 cases on prominent individuals in view of the Attorney General's statement in his memorandum of 11-17-53 that the Criminal Division would review those cases. checked in the matter and

1633  
ENCLOSURE /

called back advising that these cases were being worked on and that he would push this project along and he hoped we would begin getting results in the near future.

Since that time due to developments we initiated action to remove two of the names of the 34 prominent persons. We advised the Criminal Division that at this time was no longer considered prominent in view of the death of her husband, , and that we were adding her name to the Security Index. We advised the Department that Maryland, had been cooperative on interview and did not appear to be potentially dangerous at this time. On 2-15-54, by memorandum agreed with our observations.

On March 5, 1954, we received a memorandum from the Criminal Division regarding , one of the prominent persons listed, asking us to determine the state of his health. We are doing this.

1633

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

March 10, 1954

has been advised you  
desire to know if the Domestic  
Intelligence Division has furnished  
the Criminal Division with a list of  
special names on the Security Index  
which we want analyzed, and if  
has received it.

Enc 3

1634

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 15, 1954

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM :

~~SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION TO REVIEW SPECIAL CASES~~

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated March 11, 1954, attached, furnishing the status of the reviews by the Criminal Division of the Department of certain special cases to approve the listing of their names in the Security Index.

In connection with a statement in that memorandum that no approvals have been received since September 30, 1953, in the cases of individuals identified as United States Government, Foreign Government, United Nations and Atomic Energy Program Employees, you commented "What about approvals of Prominent persons? Send memo to A.G. indicating last date of word from Crim. Div."

For your information, the Criminal Division has not furnished us an opinion as to whether the 32 specifically named individuals prominent in the business and professional fields should be added to the Security Index. Originally there were 34 individuals in that particular group. The number was reduced to 32 when we advised the Criminal Division that one person was no longer considered prominent and we were adding her name to the Security Index and that another had cooperated fully upon interview and was not considered potentially dangerous at this time. As a result of having received no opinion from the Criminal Division regarding the 32 specifically named individuals remaining in that group, their names are not carried in the Security Index at this time.

ACTION:

If you approve, there is attached a memorandum to the Attorney General with copies designated for Assistant Attorney General again urging that opinions be furnished the Bureau as to whether the Department approves or disapproves the listing of all names of individuals described as United States Government, Foreign Government, United Nations and Atomic Energy Program Employees. In addition, the memorandum specifically names the 32 individuals described as prominent and requests advice as to whether their names should be added to the Security Index.

Ely

---

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Men... • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/23/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

*G-3*  
There are attached two copies of a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index Cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, and the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship status, and others on one of the "special" lists. A key to the abbreviations is also included.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of February 15, 1954.

Attachments

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN SECURITY INDEX

AL	Alien
CS	Comsab
DC	Detcom
KF	Key Figure
NA	Naturalized
NB	Native Born
TF	Top Functionary

AEP	Atomic Energy Program employees
BUL	Bulgarian
COM	Communist Party, USA
CZE	Czechoslovakian
ESP	Espionage subjects
FGE	Foreign Government employees
GOV	United States Government employees
HUN	Hungarian
ILL	Independent Labor League
ISL	Independent Socialist League
NPR	Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
PPA	Proletarian Party of America
PRO	Prominent Person
RUM	Rumanian
RUS	Russian
RWL	Revolutionary Workers' League
SWP	Socialist Workers' Party
ULP	United Labor Party
UNE	United Nations employees
YUG	Yugoslavian

Enc 1

1635

SECURITY INLET CARDS STATISTICS - BY FIELD OFFICE  
BASED ON STATISTICAL SECTION REPORTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1954

<sup>8</sup> Prices do not add to total column total as included in *Table 1* because it does not include the cost of the *Table 1* itself.

157

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem

lum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 19, 1954

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week, 100 new cards were added to the Security Index and 20 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 80 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 24,874.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.